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TAKING CONFLICTING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
NETTA BARAK-CORREN*
ABSTRACT
Conflicts between religious liberty and gender and LGBTQ equality
are polarizing the American society, obsessing constitutional law scholars,
and earning a slot of their own on the Supreme Court docket.
Despite the broad social significance of religion–equality conflicts,
their legal analysis has been largely captured by a handful of high-profile
cases and has ignored the varied ways in which conflicts are resolved on
the ground, often outside the courtroom.  As a result, lawmakers, scholars,
and even courts fail to fully understand conflicts of rights and fail to con-
sider all available tools to mitigate these conflicts.
This Article advances a methodological and normative approach that
improves law’s ability to take conflicts between religion and equality seri-
ously.  First, I expose the misperceptions caused by the excessive focus on
court cases and establish the need for empirical research of conflicts of
rights.  Second, I demonstrate the contribution of the suggested approach
qualitatively, using evidence from in-depth interviews with religious lead-
ers and reports of conflicts from a range of contexts.  The findings shed
light on the existence of systematic variation in the religious regulation of
sexual nonconformity.  In contrast to common assumptions, conservative
religious leaders do not rush to secure a license to discriminate, nor do
they perceive religion and equality as necessarily incommensurable.  In-
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stead, they attempt to find accommodations on the ground, drawing on
distinctions of sphere and role in an attempt to square traditional and
liberal norms, often reasoning their actions in terms of compassion, for-
giveness, evangelism, and humility.
These findings shed new light on the evidentiary value of selective
enforcement and religious consistency.  I consider three models for nor-
matively analyzing these questions, discuss the implications of the findings
for the present and future of religion–equality conflicts—will they escalate
or evaporate?—and offer several tools for political negotiators aiming to
resolve rights conflicts outside the courtroom.
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INTRODUCTION
CONSIDER a puzzle.  In Boston, Catholic Charities withdrew from pro-viding adoption services following an objection to a Massachusetts
requirement to place children with families regardless of sexual orienta-
tion.1  The Catholic Church (the Church) refused to comply with this law
despite having been placing children with same-sex families for nearly
twenty years beforehand.2
Several years earlier, the City of San Francisco government required
all contracting partners to provide health insurance to same-sex partners.3
Though the Church initially refused, ultimately the parties negotiated a
solution that allowed each employee to designate any member of the
household—effectively including same-sex partners—to receive health
benefits.4
What explains these contrasting stories of opposition of and tolerance
to LGBTQ equality?  Not religious doctrine, as both cases involve branches
of the Catholic Church, that opposed (and still opposes) the recognition
of same-sex marriage.  Yet in the San Francisco case, the Church was able
to reconcile its position with the demand for LGBTQ equality and in the
Boston case it failed to do so.  The puzzle is also not explained by the
background laws, as both cities prohibited sexual-orientation discrimina-
tion with no religious exemptions.  Neither is the puzzle solved by the ini-
tial status quo.  In Boston, the Church had been placing children with
LGBTQ parents on its own initiative, yet eventually withdrew from adop-
tions altogether.  In San Francisco, the Church did not provide and ini-
tially refused to provide health benefits to same-sex partners, yet ultimately
provided them.5  If it was not religious doctrine, legal doctrine, or the
initial positions that led to these contrasting outcomes, what can explain
the highly antithetical results of these two cases?  More generally, what can
we learn from such cases about the state of the conflict between religion
and equality, its dynamics, and its present and future points of compro-
mise and resolution?
This question could not be more pressing.  In recent decades, funda-
mental disagreements over the definition of American values and basic
social structures have formed what some call a culture war.  In this war,
conservatives and progressives engage in a multifaceted conflict over a
range of issues, including abortion, gender, sexuality, education, and race,
among others.6  One of the central fault lines in this conflict has been the
1. Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48
B.C. L. REV. 781, 843 (2007).  For a further discussion of the dispute between the
Catholic Charities and the City of Boston, see Section I.C, infra.
2. Minow, supra note 1, at 832.
3. Id. at 829.  For a further discussion of the dispute between the City of San
Francisco government and the Church, see Section I.C, infra.
4. Minow, supra note 1, at 830.
5. Id.
6. See infra Section I.A.
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tension between religious liberty and gender and LGBTQ equality, which
has developed inextricably with legal and legislative action in the last fifty
years.7  High profile cases such as Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,8 and
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission9 or even
Obergefell v. Hodges10 have appeared to epitomize the culture war and were
analyzed both in legal and broader public discourse with growing con-
cerns from the prospect of further escalation and the seeming inability to
bridge the gap between religious liberty and gender equality.  On the re-
ligious liberty side, Reverend Donald Armstrong alerted that the legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage would ignite another civil war:
The church has always stood apart from culture and state to
speak truth to both. . . .  But will Christians be granted the pro-
tections to continue to speak and act according to their faith, or
will Christian teaching become hate speech[?] . . .  Will the cross
become the next Confederate flag?11
Legal scholars have also embraced assumptions from the culture war
paradigm.  Robert Cochran and Michael Helfand describe the conflict be-
tween law and religion as a “culture war[],” in which “[t]here is no com-
mon morality to which the competing sides may look; the sides have
incommensurable values.”12  Paul Horwitz decries that the debate “is so
centered on a stark opposition between liberty and equality that any ter-
tium quid is forgotten or ignored.”13  Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel,
strong advocates of gender and LGBTQ equality, describe a cross-denomi-
national Catholic and Evangelical coalition that works to promote tradi-
tional values through lawmaking and litigation, and they alert that faith
claims will escalate in number and significance.14
In its 2020 term, the Supreme Court will consider religion–equality
conflicts yet again in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,15 involving the argument
7. See infra Section I.A.
8. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
9. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
10. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (despite not involving any direct religious liberty
claim).
11. John Stonestreet, Christian Leaders Respond to Obergefell v. Hodges: A Col-
son Center Symposium, STREAM (June 26, 2015), https://stream.org/christian-lead-
ers-respond-to-supreme-court-decision-same-sex-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/
L8VQ-GYC7].
12. Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Michael A. Helfand, Symposium: The Competing
Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1051, 1056
(2013).
13. Paul Horwitz, Against Martyrdom: A Liberal Argument for Accommodation of
Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1301, 1303 (2016) [hereinafter Horwitz, Against
Martyrdom].
14. Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Con-
science Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L. J. 2516, 2520 (2015) [hereinafter
NeJamie & Siegel, Complicity-Based Conscience].
15. 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020).
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that religious adoption agencies should be exempted from rules compel-
ling equal treatment of adoptive same-sex couples.16  The Court’s fre-
quent and repeated consideration of religion–equality conflicts is a
testament to the intensity of these conflicts and to absence of legal
frameworks that successfully advance their resolution.  The “culture war”
paradigm is part of the problem.  On the one hand, it captures the inten-
sity of the political and legal battles waged by radical ideologists who re-
present opposite cultural worldviews.  But the paradigm also overlooks a
large part of the religion–equality tension, namely the conflict that occurs
within conservative religious groups on “one side” of the culture wars, as
demonstrated in the puzzle of the Boston and San Francisco cases dis-
cussed supra.  Most of these conflicts are never litigated and entirely evade
legal analysis.
This Article argues for an expanded framework that acknowledges
and interrogates the conflict that occurs within religion in response to
equality challenges.  Developing this framework is important because
these unexamined, often ignored conflicts bear on the assessments of
scholars regarding the religion–equality conflict, compel courts to address
new questions of law, and expose overlooked points of compromise and
resolution that could answer the urging need for tools that promote the
resolution of conflicts between religion and equality.  In other words: un-
less we investigate these conflicts, we will not be taking conflicts between
religion and equality seriously.
My argument is accordingly threefold.  After discussing the culture
war paradigm and the pertinent legal background, the remainder of Part I
addresses the theoretical flaws of the culture war paradigm, primarily its
lack of sufficient attention to the variation in the religious response to
equality challenges and its insufficient explanatory power.  That is, the cul-
ture war paradigm does not explain instances of religious compliance and
compromise.  And there is a lot to explain, because in reality, conflict is
absent from many potentially conflictual scenes.  I exemplify this argu-
ment by closely analyzing the San Francisco and Boston cases.
Part II elucidates the role of methodology in constructing the culture
war paradigm and in moving forward to better models of the conflict.
First, Section II.A traces the theoretical problems of the culture war para-
digm to the methods that constitutional scholars use to produce an ac-
count of the conflict—the focus on high profile cases of religious
objection.  Cases are essential sources of knowledge for studying legal doc-
trine and court behavior.  Nevertheless, litigated cases are a highly selec-
tive pool of disputes, particularly in the context of equality claims.17  Less
than 1% of all discrimination grievances evolve into legal complaints and
16. Id. at 146–47.
17. Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 1133 (1990).
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only 6% of court filings ever reach trial.18  Additional barriers within relig-
ious communities prevent conflicts from reaching the courts.  Therefore,
focusing on high-profile cases of religious objection is likely to skew the
analysis of religion–equality conflicts, highlighting more intractable con-
flicts and steering attention away from more commonplace disputes.
Because of these flaws, the culture war paradigm obscures the reality
of the war within religion, in which religious decision-makers respond to
equality challenges not only with fire and fiery, but also with tolerance and
compromise.  The critical question that follows is, what factors determine
whether the religious response to equality challenges would be opposi-
tional or tolerant?
Uncovering these factors will improve our understanding of the con-
flict and its sources.  It can also guide the development of means to steer
away from impasse more effectively.  To get there, Section II.B argues, le-
gal scholarship cannot continue to focus on the selective pool of cases that
feed the courts.  The shift to the war within religion requires more intense
usage of empirical studies, primarily sociological and psychological stud-
ies, that can uncover the dynamics within commonplace communities and
institutions.
Part III then turns to examine the response of religious institutions to
perceived sexual nonconformity, drawing on a qualitative study that con-
ducted a series of in-depth interviews with Catholic leaders and on insights
from a range of conflicts that occurred in additional contexts and denomi-
nations, including Evangelical Baptists, Lutherans, adherents of the Alli-
ance Church, and Orthodox Jews.  Based on the findings, Section III.A
argues that in reality, conservative religious groups debate their views of
and approaches towards issues such as same-sex marriage, unmarried
pregnancy, controversial health benefits, and so on.  Even more fre-
quently, religious decision-makers find themselves carefully balancing
traditional religious norms which they are committed to uphold against
other religious values that support equality and inclusion, including com-
passion, forgiveness, humility, kindness, and love.
Section III.B then demonstrates that the religious response to claims
for LGBTQ and gender equality is often more compromising than simply
demanding exclusion and exemption.  Instead, it is moderated by what I
term social impact regulation.  That is, religious leaders decide whether to
exclude or tolerate individuals perceived to defy traditional religious
norms, including employees and students who are LGBTQ or unmarried
and pregnant, based on the perceived impact of nonconformity.  In other
words, religious leaders were more likely to seek compromise and permis-
siveness when they believed that the perceived nonconformity was not
18. ELLEN BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON & LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS ON
TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 13, 41–42,
47–49 (1st ed. 2017).
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likely to influence the behavior of other community members or weaken
the religious norm.
Notably, when confronting an equality challenge, religious decision
makers in the study did not relish the opportunity to strengthen religious
authority at all costs, as culture war analyses suggest.  Rather, they exper-
ienced the conflict as “really, really tough” and even a “nightmare.”19  In
many cases, religious leaders took affirmative actions to prevent exclusion
and avoid conflict, by ignoring and tolerating private violations of relig-
ious norms.  For example, leaders often attempted to “privatize” sexual
nonconformity rather than expose and condemn it, directing noncon-
formists to keep their nonconformity discreet from the community in or-
der to refrain from punishing and excluding them.
Social impact regulation indicates that organized religion’s approach
to gender and LGBTQ equality is not monolithic, nor is it necessarily op-
positional and escalating as the culture war paradigm posits.  In actuality,
religious leaders have substantial latitude in applying religious norms to
specific cases, and they use it to govern the challenges posed by equality
norms in nuanced ways.  Concerns about social impact moderate the
emergence and nature of the religious objection, thereby shaping con-
flicts of rights and their trajectory.20  Using these insights, Section III.C
illuminates a wide range of conflicts in relation to education, employment,
health benefits, adoption services, and social services, occurring in a range
of religions and across various American jurisdictions.
Part IV charts the key implications of the findings.  Section IV.A theo-
rizes the findings, offering three perspectives on the reasons that lead or-
ganized religion to engage in social impact regulation.  The first
perspective analyzes social impact regulation as a compromise between
preserving religious rules and preserving community members.  The sec-
ond perspective highlights the distinction between intrinsic wrongs and
prohibited wrongs which is implicit in social impact regulation.  And the
third perspective places the phenomenon in a broader socio-legal context
that suggests that social impact regulation indicates a transition towards
greater acceptance of equality claims.  Section IV.B calls on courts to ad-
dress social impact regulation in the adjudication of religion–equality
cases, and offers initial thoughts on how to do so.  Finally, Section IV.C
offers several insights for policymakers negotiating conflicts between relig-
ion and equality.
19. See Interviews with Leader #9 (May 2014); Leader #13 (June 2014); see also
infra Section III.A.
20. This is not to argue that social impact factors are the only factors shaping
the religious response to equality challenges or that they explain the entire varia-
tion of religion with respect to equality. See, e.g., Netta Barak-Corren, Does Antidis-
crimination Law Influence Religious Behavior? An Empirical Examination, 67 HASTINGS
L.J. 957 (2016) [hereinafter Barak-Corren, Antidiscrimination Law] (finding that
the legal response to religious objection moderates or intensifies the emergence of
further religious objection).  Mapping the domain of factors—each with poten-
tially different implications—is a topic for multiple studies.
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss2/1
2020] TAKING CONFLICTING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 267
Notably, the existence of social impact regulation should concern
both religious liberty and gender equality advocates, due to its two simulta-
neous effects.  On one hand, social impact regulation narrows individual
freedom in religious institutions because it confines nonconformist behav-
ior to certain roles and realms.  On the other hand, it moderates the en-
forcement of religious norms and increases tolerance of perceived sexual
nonconformity in religious institutions.  A phenomenon that simultane-
ously confers disadvantages and advantages on protected individuals in re-
ligious societies merits substantial normative scrutiny.  The Article
concludes by calling for further research on the war within religion and its
implications for the reconciliation of the conflict between religion and
equality.  I suggest that integrating social impact regulation into legal doc-
trine offers an alternative path to the stark opposition between liberty and
equality that neither courts nor policymakers previously considered.
Adopting this approach is what we ought to do to take these conflicts seri-
ously, as they ought to be taken.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RELIGION AND EQUALITY
A. The Culture War Paradigm
In an era characterized by increased social, cultural, and religious di-
versity, conflicts of norms proliferate.  In the United States, these differ-
ences in norms and beliefs have shaped what some call two separate and
opposing battle camps—two cultures at war.  In one camp, argued sociolo-
gist James Davison Hunter, are the “traditionalist or orthodox,” seeking
“continuity with the ordering principles inherited from the past.”21  In the
other camp are the “progressivists,” whose goal is “the further emancipa-
tion of the human spirit and the creation of an inclusive and tolerant
world.”22  Hunter’s influential analysis argues that the two camps are en-
gaged in a multifaceted conflict over the definition of American values
and the face of society on a wide range of issues, including abortion, gen-
der relations, sexuality, public education, and church-state issues, among
others.23  In a 2016 study, James Davison Hunter and Carl Desportes Bow-
21. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER & ALAN WOLFE, IS THERE A CULTURE WAR?: A DIA-
LOGUE ON VALUES AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 14 (2007).
22. Id. at 15.
23. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE
FAMILY, ART, EDUCATION, LAW, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 42 (1992) (examining con-
troversies regarding sexual orientation, reproduction, speech, education, and re-
ligion’s place in public life and arguing that “the divisions of political consequence
today are . . . the result of differing worldviews . . . .  [The conflict revolves] around
our most fundamental and cherished assumptions about how to order our lives—
our own lives and our lives together in this society.”); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER &
CARL DESPORTES BOWMAN, INST. FOR ADVANCED STUDIES IN CULTURE, THE VANISH-
ING CENTER OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 41 (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/iasc-
prod/uploads/pdf/2dc83bd6050a75f3fe9a.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AG4-BLMG].
9
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man report that cultural polarization has increased and intensified along
economic and racial lines.24
Since the 1960s, one of the central fault lines of the culture war has
been the conflict between traditional religious and progressive notions of
gender and LGBTQ equality.  Indeed, Hunter’s exemplar dispatches of
conflict depict diametric pairs of a conservative priest versus a homosexual
activist and a feminist pro-choice activist versus an Orthodox Jewish rabbi
who decided to join Catholics and Evangelicals in fighting against abor-
tions.25  This alliance is not anecdotal, as Hunter emphasized that the cul-
ture wars cut across religions, such that traditional Catholics, Protestants
and Jews form ideological and political alliances, and the same is true for
progressives in these faith traditions.26  The notion of a nation-wide cul-
tural–religious war was popularized in 1992 by Republican Pat Buchanan,
who declared that “[t]here is a religious war going on in this country.  It is
a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as was the Cold
War itself, for this war is for the soul of America.”27
Shifting norms, political realignments, various group behaviors, and
legal developments have all worked together as the “culture wars” have
evolved.  Specifically, the normative conflicts Hunter credits with spurring
the culture wars and subsequent polarization—surrounding reproductive
rights, family, gender, LGBTQ rights, and others—have evolved inextrica-
bly with legal battles and legislation.  In particular, the tension between
religious liberty and antidiscrimination has formed a focal point of litiga-
tion and legislation.  One of the earliest manifestations of this tension was
the attempt by several religious groups to secure exemptions from deseg-
regation mandates.28  Similar disputes over the application of antidis-
crimination law to religious institutions and businesses have since
expanded to clashes over pregnancy and reproduction techniques,29 gay
24. HUNTER & BOWMAN, supra note 23, at 43 (arguing that the battling poles
of the American public have expanded in size).  Several previous studies argued
that the American public is not in fact as polarized as expected under the culture
wars argument. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY POPE, CULTURE
WAR?: THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2d ed. 2005) (arguing that voting pat-
terns and popular attitudes on hot-button issues show that the American public is
not polarized and largely centric); HUNTER &  WOLFE, supra note 21 (Wolfe argues
similarly to Fiorina and colleagues; Hunter responds with the argument that even
if most Americans are not polarized, the culture war exists as a matter of narrative
and political discourse).
25. HUNTER, supra note 23, at 13.
26. HUNTER & WOLFE, supra note 21; HUNTER & BOWMAN, supra note 23.
27. Patrick Joseph Buchanan, Culture War Speech: Address to the Republican Na-
tional Convention, VOICES OF DEMOCRACY (Aug. 17, 1992), http://voicesofdemo
cracy.umd.edu/buchanan-culture-war-speech-speech-text/ [https://perma.cc/
2X9U-AE9J].
28. Minow, supra note 1, at 792–94; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (finding that private religious schools that enforce racially
discriminatory admissions standards are ineligible for tax-exempt status).
29. See, e.g., Evan Bleier, Teachers Fired from Massachusetts Catholic School for Out-
of-Wedlock Pregnancy, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Dec. 9, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://
10
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rights,30 and access to contraceptives.31  For example, numerous religious
groups use “moral codes” that either arguably or directly prohibit employ-
ees and students from having sex outside of marriage, pursuing in vitro
fertilization, living a homosexual “lifestyle,” or publicly supporting any of
those behaviors.32  Today, religion–equality conflicts arise in a variety of
settings spanning employment, education, and commerce, for-profit and
not-for-profit organizations.33
The Supreme Court, legislatures, administrative bodies, and lower
courts have responded to these tensions with a patchwork and sometimes
conflicting system of accommodations and protections.  At the national
www.upi.com/Odd_News/2013/12/09/Teachers-fired-from-Massachusetts-Catho
lic-school-for-out-of-welock-pregnancy/1321386618996/ [https://perma.cc/CH
9D-RE49]; Laura Hibbard, Cathy Samford, Texas Teacher, Fired for Out-of-Wedlock Preg-
nancy, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/12/cathy-
samford-teacher-fired-for-unwed-pregnancy_n_1420986.html [https://perma.cc/
HYL5-CS7F] (last updated Apr. 12, 2012).
30. See, e.g., Woodard v. Jupiter Christian Sch., Inc., 913 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2005) (alleging that a gay student was expelled after his teacher con-
fronted him about his sexual orientation); Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Chil-
dren, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 757 (W.D. Ky. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 579 F.3d
722 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing action brought by a lesbian therapist dismissed
from employment in a Southern Baptist home after a picture of her with her girl-
friend was exhibited without her knowledge).
31. See infra note 46.
32. Susan Candiotti & Chris Welch, A Litany of ‘Thou Shall Nots:’ Catholic Teach-
ers Challenge Morality Clause, CNN (May 31, 2014), https://edition.cnn.com/2014/
05/30/living/catholic-teachers-morality/index.html [https://perma.cc/G6UM-
9VCR] (last updated May 31, 2014); see also Zack Ford, Arkansas Catholic Schools
Crack Down on LGBT Students, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 12, 2016), https://think-
progress.org/arkansas-catholic-lgbt-policy-d91d804532e9/ [https://perma.cc/
3MAT-WMCA] (reporting on the Catholic Diocese of Arkansas, which coded
prohibitions on LGBTQ activity in its student handbook following legal challenges
in an apparent attempt to contract out of antidiscrimination law).  While moral
clauses are an old practice in religious institutions, the trend towards explicit
prohibitions on specific behaviors may be in response to court cases such as Dias v.
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2013 WL 360355 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30,
2013), in which the court found a less-detailed morality clause requiring only that
the employee “comply with and act consistently in accordance with the state philos-
ophy and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church,” unenforceable, largely due to
its ambiguity. Id. at *1 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Attempting to
achieve religious autonomy through contract dates back to the nineteenth century.
See CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA 61–63, 68 (1980) (describing
how utopian communities used contract and property laws to construct spaces for
their own practices).
33. While most of the cases cited in previous footnotes involve claims arising
in employment and education, some private businesses also sought the right to
exclude or deny services to LGBTQ people based on religious reasons. See, e.g.,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018);
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); Interim Order—
Ruling on Respondents’ Re-Filed Motion for Summary Judgment and Agency’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Klein, Nos. 44-14 & 45-14 (Or. Bureau
of Labor & Indus. Jan. 29, 2015) (businesses were held liable for discrimination for
refusing service to marrying LGBTQ customers for religious reasons).
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level, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act permits religious employers to give
preferences in hiring to people of shared faith, but it arguably does not
permit them to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or pregnancy, nor
does it exempt them from other civil rights laws.34  Prior to the Altitude
Express, Inc. v. Zarda35 decision that interpreted Title VII to prohibit dis-
crimination also on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity,36
twenty-two states and D.C. passed legislation to ensure protections exist
where Title VII may not reach, prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity.37  Legislators have also been active with
respect to protecting religious freedom.  The Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act, or RFRA, enacted a high level of scrutiny for laws that restrict
religious freedom,38 and twenty-one states followed with their own
RFRAs.39
The potential tension between these parallel federal and state systems
for protection of gender and LGBTQ equality and religious liberty has not
yet been resolved by the Supreme Court,40 which opted in recent years for
a series of narrow decisions on this issue.  In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church & School v. EEOC,41 the Court adjudicated a claim of disabil-
ity discrimination brought by a “called” church teacher.42  A unanimous
Court decided that churches are free to decide who preaches to their
members, notwithstanding any law (the “ministerial exception”).43  How-
ever, the Court took painstaking effort to emphasize that the decision was
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2) (2018).
35. 590 U.S. __ (2020).
36. This decision was announced just before this Article went to press.  At this
point in time, the decision’s implications for religion–equality conflicts are yet to
clarify.
37. One additional state prohibits only discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation; six additional states prohibit only discrimination against public employees
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity; and four additional states
prohibit only discrimination against public employees on the basis of sexual orien-
tation only. State Maps of Law and Policies, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.
org/state-maps/employment [https://perma.cc/75KN-PZ98] (last updated May
23, 2020).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012), invalidated in part, City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (as applied to states).  The RFRA was enacted in re-
sponse to Employment Division v. Smith, to restore the standard of scrutiny that the
previous precedent reflected.  494 U.S. 872 (1990).
39. 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TURES (May 4, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/
2015-state-rfra-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/N44W-GL8D].
40. The very acknowledgment of this tension as a live issue is fairly new.  As
Elizabeth Sepper writes, before Hobby Lobby “courts resisted businesses’ claims to
religious exemptions . . . even religiously affiliated nonprofit businesses did not
win exemptions from employee- and consumer-protective laws, including insur-
ance regulations and antidiscrimination laws.”  Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accom-
modation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 24, 25 (2014).
41. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
42. Id. at 699–700.
43. Id. at 706.
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restricted to the facts of the case, in which the teacher held spiritual re-
sponsibilities.44  In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Court granted a relig-
ious exemption to closely-held for-profit corporations who refused to
provide contraceptive coverage to their employees as part of its health in-
surance policy.45  However, the decision was premised on the assurance
that the exemption would have “precisely zero” effect on women’s access
to contraceptives.46  In other words, the Court’s majority did not perceive
the case as presenting an actual conflict between religious liberty and gen-
der equality; it did emphasize that accommodations must not unduly re-
strict third-party interests.47  Two years later, the Court expanded LGBTQ
rights in the Obergefell v. Hodges48 decision on marriage equality.  The
Court alluded to the concern that this expansion might further the fric-
tion between LGBTQ equality and religious liberty, but deferred the reso-
lution to a later time.49  Recently, the Court had an opportunity to resolve
the question in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion,50 involving a baker who refused to create a wedding cake for a same-
sex couple for religious reasons.  Again, the Court chose to deflect the
broader constitutional questions and issue a narrow decision that focused
on the Colorado commission’s arguably hostile treatment of the baker.
The Court deliberately chose not to decide whether the baker was allowed
to refuse service to the couple.51
The deliberate ambiguity on the part of the Supreme Court has re-
sulted in a lack of clear guideline on how courts should apply Title VII and
the many state laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual
44. Id. at 707–09.  The “ministerial exception” rule has been applied by lower
courts at least since McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), but was
recognized by the Supreme Court for the first time in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
45. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014).
46. Id. at 2760 (“The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the wo-
men employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases
would be precisely zero.  Under that accommodation, these women would still be
entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing.”).  A later chal-
lenge by religious non-profits did not conclude with a holding. See Zubik v.
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (vacating and remanding for the parties “to
arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ [including
various schools] religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women
covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, in-
cluding contraceptive coverage’”).
47. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
49. Id. at 2607.
50. 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734 (2018); see also Arlene Flowers, Inc. v. Washington,
138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (cert. petition granted, judgment vacated and case re-
manded for further consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop).
51. The Court noted that the plaintiff was “entitled to a neutral deci-
sionmaker who would give full and fair consideration to his religious objection,”
but did not conclude what the outcome of the case would have been had the Colo-
rado commission not have been found to fail that requirement. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
13
Barak-Corren: Taking Conflicting Rights Seriously
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
272 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65: p. 259
orientation, and other bases when these laws conflict with religious mo-
tives and practices.  And indeed, lower courts’ positions on these cases
diverge by a surprisingly large margin.  Some courts apply antidiscrimina-
tion law broadly and interpret religious exemptions and moral contracts
narrowly,52 whereas other courts take the inverse approach.53
The culture war has become an influential paradigm in the legal anal-
ysis of conflicts between religious liberty and gender and LGBTQ equality.
It was used to explain both the emergence and contested reception of
high-profile cases such as Hobby Lobby54 and Masterpiece.55  The culture war
also played a dominant role in the analysis of the public and legal contro-
52. Such “pro-equality” courts apply the law to all religious employers and
service providers, whether individual, for-profit or not-for-profit.  Under this view,
Title VII’s religious exemption does not allow religious employers to escape liabil-
ity “for discrimination based on race, color, sex or national origin.”  Dolter v. Wah-
lert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 269 (N.D. Iowa 1980).  Discrimination in hiring
and treatment of religious ministers (the “ministerial exception”) is allowed.
Courts, however, stick to McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972),
which restricted this exception to the “church-minister relationship” and refrained
from “any decision as to other church employees.” Id. at 555.  Therefore, employ-
ees who are not ministers (and most are not) are not barred from raising discrimi-
nation claims. See, e.g., Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp.
3d 1168, 1177 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (holding that a lay language arts teacher with no
role in religious education is not a minister); Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati,
No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2013 WL 360355 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013) (holding that a
computer and technology instructor is not a minister).  Plaintiffs still need to
demonstrate that moral standards are not neutral as religious respondents argue,
but discriminatory as is or as applied. See, e.g., Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-
South Bend Inc., No. 1:12-CV-122 RLM, 2015 WL 1013783, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 9,
2015) (providing evidence that three male employees who were thrown out of a
strip club after harassing one of the performers were reprimanded but not fired);
Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344, 359–60 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(holding that a private sectarian institution “has the right to employ only teachers
who adhere to the school’s moral code,” but ordering factual determination to see
if a neutral policy against premarital sex may be discriminatory as applied as the
sexual activities of females are easier to discover).
53. Such “pro-religion” courts interpret religious exemptions broadly. See,
e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 945 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that “Congress has
exempted religious institutions from much of Title VII’s prohibition against em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of religion,” and rejecting the discrimination
claims of a Protestant lay teacher who was dismissed from a Catholic school after
failing to remarry pursuant to the “proper canonical process”); Alicea-Hernandez
v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a com-
munications manager is a minister, barring sex and ethnicity discrimination
claim); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 805 (4th Cir.
2000) (holding that the cathedral’s director of music ministry and part-time music
teacher is a minister, barring sex discrimination claim).
54. Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 155–56,
184–89 (2014) [hereinafter Horwitz, Hobby Lobby]; NeJamie & Siegel, Complicity-
Based Conscience, supra note 14.
55. Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspec-
tive: Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RE-
THINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 187 (Susanna
Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018) [hereinafter NeJamie & Siegel, Transna-
tional Perspective].
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versies that followed the legalization of same-sex marriage, including the
conservative faith groups’ almost immediate call for exemptions and the
refusal of a county registrar to register same-sex marriage following
Obergefell.56  The responses of conservative religious leaders to Obergefell
alone elucidate the phenomenon.  Jim Daly, president of Focus on the
Family, a conservative Christian advocacy organization, said in response to
the decision,
Many people of faith are concerned that this decision will fan the
flames of government hostility against individuals, businesses,
and religious organizations whose religious convictions prevent
them from officiating at, participating in, or celebrating such un-
ions.  We’ve already watched this hostility operate against wed-
ding vendors, military chaplains, and others, and anticipate that
today’s decision will open the door to an unwelcome escalation
of this problem.57
Others advocated for a more proactive challenge of the ruling.  Pro-
fessor Robert George, a conservative Catholic, wrote before the decision
was released,
The Republican Party, the Republican Congress, and a future Re-
publican President should regard and treat the decision just as
the Republican Party, the Republican Congress, and the Republi-
can President—Abraham Lincoln—regarded and treated the
Dred Scott decision.  They should, in other words, treat it as anti-
constitutional and illegitimate ruling . . . [t]hey should refuse to
treat and regard it as a binding and settled matter.  They should
challenge it legislatively and give the Supreme Court every op-
portunity to reverse itself—especially as new justices fill
vacancies.58
Perhaps best encapsulating culture war discourse was the response of
Reverend Donald Armstrong, who considered the possibility that Obergefell
would ignite another civil war:
56. Erik Eckholm, Conservative Lawmakers and Faith Groups Seek Exemptions After
Same-Sex Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/
27/us/conservative-lawmakers-and-faith-groups-seek-exemptions-after-same-sex-
ruling.html [https://perma.cc/HH9K-7FAK]; see also Alan Blinder & Richard Pé-
rez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-sex-marriage-
kentucky-kim-davis.html [https://perma.cc/2UAG-3PNK]; Stonestreet, supra note
11.
57. Focus on the Family, Jim Daly Responds to the Supreme Court Ruling, YOU-
TUBE (June 26, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=51&v=
ADMhZrID-ps [https://perma.cc/4P4Q-V5U9].
58. Roger P. George, How Republicans Should Respond to a Supreme Court Mar-
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The church has always stood apart from culture and state to
speak truth to both. . . .  But will Christians be granted the pro-
tections to continue to speak and act according to their faith, or
will Christian teaching become hate speech[?] . . .  Will the cross
become the next Confederate flag?59
This pattern of cases and public discourse contributed to a view of the
religion–equality conflict as a culture war, in which “there is no common
morality to which the competing sides may look; the sides have incommen-
surable values.”60  Horwitz, agreeing that the conflict is “over irreconcila-
ble fundamental values,” decries that the debate “is so centered on a stark
opposition between liberty and equality that any tertium quid is forgotten or
ignored.”61  Ira Lupu observed that “LGBT equality and religious freedom
increasingly appear to be on a collision course.”62  Indeed, the most no-
ticeable insights of the culture-war analyses of the conflict between relig-
ion and equality have been that (1) the ideological divide between the two
camps is irreconcilable, (2) that religious groups are monolithic and stag-
nant in their views, and (3) that there exists cause for concern regarding
further intensification of the conflict.  Despite many other differences,
conservative and progressive law professors are united in these
assessments.63
On one side, progressives view religious conservatives to be constantly
seeking new ground for conflict with unflinching determination.  For ex-
ample, NeJaime and Siegel argue in several pieces that claims for religious
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws reflect the same effort to pre-
serve traditional gender norms that characterized the religious objection
to enacting these laws from the first place, what they call “preservation
through transformation.”64  They describe several religious advocacy
groups, thinkers, and pastors—some of which are quoted above—who
work to build cross-denominational Catholic and Evangelical coalitions to
promote traditional values through lawmaking and litigation.65  Thus,
59. Stonestreet, supra note 11.
60. Cochran & Helfand, supra note 12, at 1056, drawing on James Davison
Hunter, Law, Religion, and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1065 (2013).
61. Horwitz, Against Martyrdom, supra note 13, at 1303.  The third alternative
that Horwitz advocates for is a notion of legal pluralism that would accommodate
religious illiberalism by exempting it from antidiscrimination law.
62. Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of
LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 1 (2015).
63. On the sociological side, there is actually disagreement on whether there
is, in fact, a culture war in America. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
64. NeJaime & Siegel, Complicity-Based Conscience, supra note 14, at 2552–53.
Reiva Siegel first coined this term in a different context in Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule
of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996).  It
was later adopted and expanded in Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex
Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimina-
tion, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2012) [hereinafter NeJaime, Marriage Inequality] and
further developed by NeJaime & Siegel, Complicity-Based Conscience, supra note 14.
65. NeJaime & Siegel, Complicity-Based Conscience, supra note 14, at 2544–52.
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they argue that religious accommodations “may continue democratic con-
flict in new forms”66 and faith claims would escalate in number and
significance.67
Whereas NeJaime and Siegel primarily focus on how religious exemp-
tions might influence third parties outside the religious community, Caro-
line Mala Corbin criticizes organized religion’s employment practices,
writing that “religious organizations can, and regularly do, deny women
the influential position of minister, priest, rabbi, and imam on the
grounds that religious doctrine requires such discrimination.  Religious
organizations whose beliefs do not require discrimination or even forbid it
can also assert the ministerial exemption.”68  Corbin then criticizes relig-
ion for broadening the definition of “minister” to include a range of posi-
tions and organizations that extend far beyond the traditional clergy, thus
broadening the scope of discrimination.69  Corbin acknowledges that not
all religious organizations discriminate on the basis of sex, yet she remains
concerned that they would, simply because they can.  A similar concern is
expressed by NeJaime in his objection to allowing religious individuals and
entities to refuse to “treat as valid” same-sex marriages.70  NeJaime believes
that the exemptions for such discriminatory behavior are overly broad and
warns that religious individuals would take every opportunity to express
condemnation and disapproval of LGBTQ people.71  Mark Stern is con-
cerned that if there is any religious accommodation, “inevitably, it will
soon stretch to restaurants, hotels, movie theaters—in short, to all facets of
public life.  A religious right to discriminate against gay people will lead
directly to anti-gay segregation.”72
Without taking any stand regarding the substantive arguments of
these scholars,73 collectively and perhaps inadvertently they portray relig-
ious attitudes as antithetical to equality and susceptible to even further
escalation.  This image is not unique to legal scholarship, and it is exacer-
66. Id. at 2521.
67. Id. 2520; see also NeJaime & Siegel, Transnational Perspective, supra note 55.
68. Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV 1965, 1968 (2007).
69. Id. at 1976–77.
70. NeJaime, Marriage Inequality, supra note 64.
71. Id. at 1231–36.
72. Mark Joseph Stern, Anti-Gay Segregation May Soon Be Coming to Oregon,
SLATE (Feb. 4, 2014), https://slate.com/human-interest/2014/02/oregon-anti-
gay-referendum-the-initiative-is-homophobic-segregation.html [https://perma.cc/
ZV5N-T67B].
73. Andrew Koppelman, for example, argues that these concerns are exagger-
ated.  Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections
for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 134–35
(2006).  Koppleman relies on mostly anecdotal evidence to back this claim.  I am
more sympathetic to these concerns after finding in a previous work that religious
accommodations, at least in some settings, can in fact expand religious objection.
See Barak-Corren, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 20.
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bated in the public arena, where religious conservatives are often referred
to “as hateful bigots.”74
To be clear, there are high-profile religious activists who match this
description and others who work relentlessly to perpetuate the conflict.
The problem, however, is that that the culture war paradigm enables little
to no discussion of religious responses other than objection to antidis-
crimination law.  And any discussion of religious change refers mostly to
the concern that religion will become even more discriminatory.75
Surprisingly, this analysis persists even in arguments supporting relig-
ious liberty.  For example, Horwitz is worried, post-Hobby Lobby, that the
trend towards expanding LGBTQ rights will create new frontiers against
religion.76  In a later piece Horwitz argues that refusals to accommodate
religion in this context may “push some religious individuals and commu-
nities to become more strongly attached to illiberal beliefs and practices,”
and even seek martyrdom.77  Horwitz notes in passing that law “may [also]
cause some groups, or some members of those groups, to alter their beliefs
or conform their conduct to liberal norms of equality and nondiscrimina-
tion,”78 but he does not pursue this idea further.  Horwitz’s argument is
particularly interesting because it is sensitive to the problematic assump-
tions underlying the debate.  Horwitz describes objections to religious ac-
commodations as rooted in perceptions, which he designates as fears, that
religious groups are deeply illiberal organizations that inflict substantial
harm on their members and on others.79  Instead of refuting or complicat-
ing these perceptions, Horwitz, in essence, encourages liberals’ fears,
warning liberals that by refusing accommodation, they will actually ad-
vance illiberalism and realize their most concerning fears.80
74. Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture
Wars, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 260, 267–69 (2010) (describing responses in the
public sphere towards conservatives that are quick to accuse them of bigotry, even
if they support equal rights for LGBTQ people and/or various compromises re-
garding marriage).
75. See, e.g., MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 33, 35 (2014) (arguing that accommodations encourage relig-
ious “narcissism” and further disobedience); NeJaime, supra note 64; Nejaime &
Siegel, Complicity-Based Conscience, supra note 14, at 2544 (arguing that “religious
accommodation may extend, rather than resolve, conflict”).  It is rare to find analy-
ses that consider the conditions under which religious objection might decline or
other forms of religious dynamism, but see Section I.B, supra.
76. Horwitz, Hobby Lobby, supra note 54.
77. Horwitz, Against Martrydom, supra note 13, at 1306.  In effect, one cannot
evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of martyrdom, relative to other responses,
without data.  In a previous work on the conflict between religion and equality
(which Horwitz cites), I find no empirical support for the concern that refusing
religious accommodation would cause massive disobedience or erode the rule of
law or democratic legitimacy.  Barak-Corren, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 20.
78. Horwitz, Against Martrydom, supra note 13, at 1306.
79. Id. at 1311.
80. Id. at 1334.
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The culture war paradigm captures the intensity of the political and
legal battles waged by extreme ideologists who represent opposite cultural
worldviews.  But, as the next Part demonstrates, the paradigm also over-
looks a large part of the religion–equality tension, namely the conflict that
takes place within conservative religious groups on “one side” of the cul-
ture wars.  It presents religious reactions to issues of gender and LGBTQ
equality as universally antagonistic, whereas in fact, there is substantial di-
versity even inside the most conservative communities,81 and substantial
dynamism in the religious responses to the conflict.82  Currently, the law
does not sufficiently consider the implications of this variation for the con-
flict between religion and equality.
B. From a War Between Cultures to a War Within Culture
There are several important exceptions to the analysis of the relig-
ion–equality conflict as a war between cultures.  Madhavi Sunder recog-
nizes the existence of “cultural dissent,” or “challenges by individuals
within a community to modernize, or broaden, the traditional terms of
cultural membership.”83  Sunder criticizes the courts for their monolithic
view of religion and argues that this approach risks ossifying religious cul-
ture in its traditional form.84  She argues that cultural challenges, many
coming from devout women and LGBTQ individuals, should be acknowl-
edged as claims of cultural and religious rights.85  In sum, Sunder eluci-
dates the diversification of religion at the grassroots while sharing the
predominant opinion that religious leadership is rigid and anti-
egalitarian.
In contrast, William Eskridge describes the gradual shift favoring egal-
itarianism in organized religion’s attitudes towards both slavery in the past
and homosexuality today.86  Eskridge proposes that this shift contributed
81. Hunter recognized that the cultural division often falls within churches
and religions, and not necessarily between them, although his main focus was on
cross-denominational alliances. HUNTER, supra note 23, at 140.  For more recent
data, see PEW RESEARCH CENTER, CHANGING ATTITUDES ON GAY MARRIAGE: PUBLIC
OPINION ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2017), http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/
changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/5V7E-N5LC] (presenting
evidence on substantial variation regarding sexuality norms among all large Ameri-
can Christian denominations and across all levels of worship); Barak-Corren, An-
tidiscrimination Law, supra note 20 (same).
82. Barak-Corren, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 20, at 993–96, 1003–10
(providing evidence from large-scale experiments among U.S. Christians of
changes in decisions in response to alternative legal outcomes).
83. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 498 (2001).
84. Id. at 507 (considering the law’s role in “facilitating or hindering modern-
ization and social change, focusing in particular on how law has become complicit
in the backlash project of preserving cultural traditions against change”).
85. See id. at 500–01.
86. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status,
Belief, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657 (2011) (cit-
ing Brief of the Alliance of Baptists, et al., Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102),  2003 WL 152331).
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to the growth of antidiscrimination protections.87  Among other exam-
ples, Eskridge describes an amicus brief against a Texas law criminalizing
sodomy filed by “six denominations and twenty-three gay-affirming groups
within other denominations”88 in Lawrence v. Texas.89  Some of these
groups considered homosexual sex a sin, yet believed that criminalizing
homosexuality was un-Christian; others did not consider homosexuality a
sin at all.90  Eskridge describes this brief as part of a larger series of intense
debates within and between churches about their attitudes regarding sex-
ual orientation.91  Eskridge points to similar historic processes that
changed the approach of all religious denominations towards slavery.92
His analysis demonstrates that dynamism is reserved not only to progres-
sive denominations, but also characterizes at varying levels even the most
conservative denominations.93
Robin Fretwell Wilson holds a unique position in this debate.  At the
descriptive level, she frequently affirms the culture war paradigm by focus-
ing on the opposition between conservative religion and progressive egal-
itarians.94  At the political level, however, Wilson seeks to refute the
paradigm, believing it is possible to “square faith and sexuality”95 by enact-
ing LGBTQ discrimination protections that include specific, well-tailored
religious exemptions.96  Wilson’s efforts to achieve compromise are lauda-
ble, but they are limited as they do not consider the dynamics within relig-
ious groups and the implications of these dynamics for the array of
potential solutions.
Crucially, if religion is diverse and dynamic both at the grassroots
level, as Sunder claims, and at the leadership level, as Eskridge argues,
then the conventional culture war paradigm largely misses the point.  The
conflict within cultures is as deserving of focus as that between cultures.
Sunder and Eskridge each highlight a different account of religious
groups’ positions vis-à-vis equality, but how can these accounts be recon-
ciled?  More specifically, what determines the position that organized re-
ligion takes towards equality challenges, whether oppositional, as
emphasized by Sunder, or tolerant, as emphasized by Eskridge?
87. Id.
88. Id. at 705.
89. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
90. Eskridge, supra note 86.
91. See id. at 704–05.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Squaring Faith and Sexuality: Religious Institutions
and the Unique Challenge of Sports, 34 LAW & INEQUALITY 385 (2016).
95. Id.
96. Robin Fretwell Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social
Change: What Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience Clauses Teach About Specific Ex-
emptions, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 703 (2014); Robin Fretwell Wilson & Anthony
Michael Kreis, Embracing Compromise: Marriage Equality and Religious Liberty in the
Political Process, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 485 (2014).
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C. The War Within Culture: Between Opposition and Tolerance
A useful starting point in endeavoring to answer this question can be
found in Martha Minow’s description of contemporary church–state
equality conflicts.97  Minow describes two conflicts that are almost reverse
images of one another from start to finish.98  The first conflict involves a
dispute between the Catholic Church and the San Francisco government
over health insurance for same-sex partners.99  The Church initially op-
posed the city’s intention to oblige contracting parties, including the
Church, to provide health benefits to same-sex partners.100  But ulti-
mately, the parties negotiated a solution, which allowed each employee to
designate any member of the household, regardless of the relationship, to
receive health benefits.101  Justifying the solution, the Archbishop ex-
plained that “[w]e would know no more or no less about the employee’s
relationship with that person than we typically know . . . .  What we have
done is to prohibit local government from forcing our Catholic agencies
to create internal policies that recognize domestic partnerships as a cate-
gory equivalent to marriage.”102
In contrast to the compromise achieved in San Francisco is the crisis
that evolved in Boston once news broke that Catholic charities were plac-
ing children with LGBTQ parents for adoption.103  As Minow relates, an
internal conflict erupted within the Catholic community, with lay
Catholics supporting LGBTQ placements and the Catholic leadership ob-
jecting and seeking an exemption from antidiscrimination law.104  The
state refused and the Church ceased providing adoption services in
Boston.105
Minow notes the paradox posed by these contrasting stories of toler-
ance and opposition and suggests that “attitudes of respect, flexibility, and
humility can help generate new answers beyond ‘exemption’ and ‘no ex-
emption’ when religious principles and civil rights laws collide.”106  This
advice, while sound, is very general.  I propose that more specific proposi-
tions can be drawn from these cases.
The first fact to note about these contrasting cases is that religious
doctrine did not dictate their outcomes.  In both cases, the official posi-
tion of the Catholic Church was and still is opposed to recognition of
same-sex marriage and partnerships.  Yet in the San Francisco case, the
97. Minow, supra note 1.
98. Id. at 829–37 (providing an elaborate account of the two stories, including
some intersections between the leading characters).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 829–30.
101. Id. at 830–31.
102. Id. at 831.
103. Id. at 831–37.
104. Id. at 833.
105. Id. at 836.
106. Id. at 844.
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Church was able to reconcile its position with LGBTQ families’ demand
for equal treatment and in the Boston case it failed to do so.  These out-
comes were also not a function of the background laws, as both cities pro-
hibited LGBTQ discrimination with no religious exemptions.  Neither did
the initial status quo play a role in the contrasting outcomes of the two
cases.  In Boston, the Church, on its own initiative, was already engaged in
placing children with LGBTQ parents, yet eventually withdrew from adop-
tions altogether.107  In San Francisco, the Church initially refused to pro-
vide health benefits to same-sex partners yet ultimately provided them.108
These reactions demonstrate that the dynamic within religious groups can
work both ways.  If it was not religious doctrine, legal doctrine, or the ini-
tial positions that led to these contrasting outcomes, what can explain the
highly antithetical results in these two cases?
The factor proposed here and developed in this Article is the differ-
ence between public and private action.  Minow notes that “high profile
publicity . . . contributed to the failure of accommodation over the adop-
tion policies.”109  Indeed, in Boston, publicity sabotaged the Catholic
Charities’ low-profile placement of children with LGBTQ parents.  But this
is only part of the picture.  Comparing the two cases suggests that the in-
terplay between public and private had an even stronger influence, be-
cause in San Francisco, it was privacy that facilitated the provision of health
benefits to LGBTQ partners.  The San Francisco compromise allowed
each employee to designate any member of the household, regardless of
the relationship, to receive health benefits.  According to the Archbishop’s
explanation, this framework allowed the Church to “not know” what ex-
actly was “the employee’s relationship with that person.”110  Keeping the
nature of the relationship private satisfied the Church’s interest in avoid-
ing recognition of same-sex relationships as equal to marriage.  A rule that
links benefits with marriage requires LGBTQ employees to go public and
thus requires employers to “know” the sexual identity of the partner.  In
contrast, a rule that breaks the link between benefits and marriage avoids
the dilemma entirely.  The fact that a self-imposed privacy mechanism re-
moved the Church’s objection to providing benefits to same-sex partners,
along with other designated persons, is revealing.  Using this mechanism,
the Catholic Church was able to acquiesce in LGBTQ equality, similar to
fundamentalist churches during the civil rights era that first acquiesced in
and then embraced racial equality.111  Similarly, in Boston, Catholic Char-
ities reported openness to an accommodation in which they could refer
certain cases to other state adoption contractors that did place children
into same-sex families, so long as they themselves were not responsible for
the placements (or overtly aware of them).  This would have allowed Cath-
107. Id. at 831–36.
108. Id. at 829–31.
109. Id. at 838.
110. Id. at 831.
111. Eskridge, supra note 86, at 678.
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olic Charities to continue its adoption work, though it would have repre-
sented a step back from direct same-sex placements.  However, because
the state was uncompromising in its position that all adoption contractors
must be willing to place children into same-sex households themselves,
this more private solution was never realized.  Notably, the way Catholic
Charities had been doing the same-sex placements previously followed a
very similar logic to the San Francisco accommodation—it placed a child
with a “single,” as in unmarried, person and didn’t “interrogate” about the
person’s “private sexual life.”112  Catholic Charities had been cultivating a
privatizing solution to this dilemma for a long time—but that solution was
jeopardized with publicity.
This Part has argued that the dominant view of the conflict between
religion and equality as a war between cultures is incomplete and simplis-
tic and must be refined with the understanding that the conflict is within
culture as much as it is between cultures.  This insight raises a crucial ques-
tion to the negotiation and resolution of these conflicts: what factors de-
termine whether religion takes an oppositional or a tolerant position
towards equality challenges?  The answer necessarily involves many ele-
ments.  As the next Part will demonstrate, the Boston/San Francisco con-
trast is not an anecdote.  The distinction between public and private has a
broad, systematic, and highly consequential impact on conflicts between
religion and equality.  This Article will also show that the public/private
distinction is part of a broader framework that religious communities em-
ploy to regulate cultural challenges, a framework this Article terms social
impact regulation.  Organized religion’s attitude toward gender and LGBTQ
equality is not monolithic, nor is it necessarily oppositional.  The religious
response to equality challenges depends on the anticipated impact of per-
ceived sexual nonconformity on others in the community and on the sta-
tus of religious norms.
I will now turn to discuss the methodology of the study and its find-
ings regarding how social impact regulation shapes the religious response
to equality challenges.113
II. OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
This Part begins, in Section A, by explaining why the dominant focus
in the literature on court cases and judicial opinions is insufficient for
producing an accurate understanding of the full scope of conflicts be-
tween religion and equality.  It then proceeds, in Section B, to describe
the alternative methodology of this Article that focuses on the actions and
decisions of grassroots religious decision makers.
112. Minow, supra note 1, at 834.
113. Notably, this Article does not attempt to map the entire variation in the
religious response to equality challenges.  It focuses on a central phenomenon,
which consists of multiple factors that influence the conflict jointly and separately.
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A. Studying the Conflict from Cases: The Limitations
The first limitation of studying the conflict from cases is that cases
represent only a small fraction of the overall number of disputes.  As this
Section shows, this general limitation is particularly relevant for equality
claims and for claims arising within religious communities.  As a result,
analyses of the conflict between religion and equality that focus primarily
on cases may not represent the majority of disputes in this category.
A long line of work by law and society scholars has established that
social disputes are dynamic processes that evolve in phases.  Richard Miller
and Austin Sarat offered the metaphor of the “dispute pyramid,”114 to de-
scribe the evolution of disputes from injuries starting with claims and con-
frontations with the injuring party, moving on to the involvement of
lawyers, and ending with adjudication.115  Miller and Sarat define this pro-
cess as a pyramid because many disputes are dropped at each phase, as
claimants settle their claims or choose to withdraw them altogether.116
The cases that ultimately become lawsuits represent a small fraction of all
disputes, and the cases that result in a judicial decision are only a tiny
fraction among those.117  Miller and Sarat, and others, have criticized le-
gal scholarship for overly focusing on adjudication and failing to grasp its
limited role in the much broader reality of dispute resolution.118
The focus on court cases is particularly problematic in the context of
equality claims, where it is particularly likely to lead to biased evaluations
of the characteristics of discrimination.  A comprehensive study by Ellen
Berrey, Robert Nelson, and Laura Beth Nielsen estimated that only a tiny
fraction of discrimination grievances evolved into legal complaints and
only 6% of court filings ever reach trial.119  In a previous survey of employ-
ment antidiscrimination cases, Peter Siegelman and John Donohue discov-
ered significant differences between published and unpublished cases.120
114. Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assess-
ing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 544–46 (1980).
115. Id.; see also Richard L. Abel, William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980); Catherine R. Albiston, Lauren B. Edelman & Joy Milligan,
The Dispute Tree and the Legal Forest, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 105 (2014).
116. Miller & Sarat, supra note 114, at 544–46.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 565 (“Our research points the way toward yet a further ‘backward’
movement in the sociology of law.  Legal realism moved the study of law from an
exclusive preoccupation with courts and in so doing helped establish the intellec-
tual respectability of dispute processing and other sociological studies of law
. . . .”).  Notably, studying cases and opinions is crucial to understanding how
courts adjudicate cases and what legal arguments fare better in court.  The criti-
cism is relevant to questions about the evolution of social conflicts and the impact
of law outside the courtroom.
119. BERREY ET AL., supra note 18, at 13, 41–42, 47–49 (surveying evidence
from multiple sources and estimating the rate of EEOC complaints at 1% of all
grievances and that of lawsuits at 3% of all grievances).
120. Siegelman & Donohue III, supra note 17.
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Published cases had thicker files and more plaintiffs, and were more likely
to be class actions, to include allegations of continuous violations, to seek
more forms of remedy, to yield larger monetary awards, and to be submit-
ted faster after the injury than unpublished cases.121  Published cases were
also less likely to involve discrimination in firing and more likely to involve
retaliation.122  Studying the conflict between religion and equality only
from court cases therefore risks biasing the analysis in all of these dimen-
sions, for example by failing to capture the mechanisms driving discrimi-
nation in firing or in single-shot acts of discrimination.
Previous studies did not break down their results by type of employ-
ers, such as religious or non-religious, and bias is expected to be even
higher in disputes involving religious institutions.  Early sociological re-
search on the relationship between religious communities and the law
showed that orthodox religious communities tend to avoid litigation and
prefer internal dispute settlement mechanisms, such an church tribunals
and informal reconciliation.123  Communal norms and institutions often
discourage members from turning to secular courts, filing suit, or even
consulting a lawyer, all of which can result in retaliation.124  Religious
communities might also attempt to impose religious norms and prevent
the application of state standards through contractual arrangements, such
as employment contracts and codebooks that oblige their members to con-
form to religious norms.125  As a result of these practices, many conflicts
are unlikely to reach the courts and their characteristics remain hidden.  If
employees believe that as a result of a moral code they signed they have no
ground to bring forth a discrimination lawsuit, this subset of grievances
will not be represented in the case law.  If members of a particular church
resolve their conflict internally, the resulting set of solutions will not be
represented in the case law.  This representation gap is particularly impor-
tant given, on one hand, the tiny fraction of discrimination grievances that
actually become cases, and, on the other hand, evidence on the ubiquity
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1150–54.
123. CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND COMMU-
NITY IN AN AMERICAN TOWN (1989) (offering an ethnographic study of attitudes
toward conflict and law in a predominantly white, middle-class, suburban, and
principally Southern Baptist community).
124. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694 (2012) (describing a religious school that dismissed a teacher who alleged
disability discrimination after she consulted with a lawyer, arguing that she was
obliged to settle disputes under the church internal dispute mechanism).
125. WEISBROD, supra note 32, at 61–63, 68 (describing how utopian commu-
nities in nineteenth century America used contract and property laws to construct
spaces for their own practices).  A contemporary example is provided by Zack
Ford, Arkansas Catholic Schools Crack Down on LGBT Students, THINK PROGRESS (Sept.
12, 2016, 6:54 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/arkansas-catholic-lgbt-policy-
d91d804532e9/ [https://perma.cc/8FUF-WUHW] (reporting on the Catholic Di-
ocese of Arkansas that coded prohibitions on LGBTQ activity in its student hand-
book following legal challenges, in an apparent attempt to contract out of
antidiscrimination law).
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of conflicts between law and religion.  In one study that interviewed Or-
thodox Jewish leaders, heads of institutions (not activists), on conflicts
with the law, I found that more than 70% reported to have personally
experienced such conflict and some described it as occurring as frequently
as on a bi-weekly basis.126  The data I discuss below show similar intensity.
In sum, the little we currently know, empirically, on conflicts between
religion and equality provides grounds for concern on the accuracy of
analyses that draw primarily on court cases.  These cases most likely re-
present a tiny fraction of discrimination grievances and a tiny fraction of
the conflicts experienced by religious decision-makers.127  High-profile
court cases may resonate with the culture war paradigm as they feature
unrelenting religious objectors and uncompromising equality advocates,
but the actual picture could have appeared entirely different had we con-
sidered the majority of disputes which never reaches the courts.
B. Studying the Conflict from Within
Due to the limitations of relying on court cases and the scarcity of
alternative data on conflicts between religion and equality, it is imperative
that constitutional scholars actively engage in collecting data on these con-
flicts.  Court cases are an important starting point for any such analysis—
cases can direct us to fertile contexts for research, identify arenas of con-
flict, and provide initial information on its contours.  But they should not
be the end point of the inquiry.  Naturally, this proposition primarily ap-
plies to scholars interested in understanding the causes of conflicts, what
factors shape their direction and whether they reach litigation, and how to
design policies to govern conflict effectively.  Going beyond the case law is
less concerning for scholars whose main interest lies in constructing legal
doctrine (but see Part V, which charts several doctrinal implications of the
findings).
How should data on rights conflicts be collected?  There are many
viable empirical methods.  Some questions could benefit from historical
investigation, others from a qualitative, sociological approach.  And yet
other questions may require quantitative examinations, experimental or
other.  Importantly, questions regarding the interaction between law and
other complex social institutions, including religion, often require a con-
certed effort of several different studies deploying multiple methods along
several points in time.
The present study initiates this effort by conducting a preliminary in-
vestigation of the perspective of religious decision-makers on equality chal-
126. Netta Barak-Corren, Beyond Dissent and Compliance: Religious Decision Mak-
ers and Secular Law, 6 OXF. J.L. & RELIGION 293 (2017) [hereinafter Barak-Corren,
Beyond Dissent].
127. Additional support for this claim can be derived from my failure to trace
a legal record for most media reports on dismissals of LGBTQ or unmarried preg-
nant people by religious institutions.  In most of these reported events, there was
no record of a legal proceeding ever being filed.
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lenges, an investigation aiming to discern internal factors that potentially
shape the religious response to equality challenges.  The study therefore
focuses on uncovering conflicts that occur within religious institutions and
it analyzes how they are regulated, negotiated, and resolved.  This research
question guided the selection of qualitative fieldwork as the primary
method of inquiry.  In-depth interviews with grassroots religious leaders
are a natural starting point to expose the range of experienced conflicts
and the ways these conflicts are handled.
The interviews were conducted with a diverse sample of seventeen
Catholic educational leaders,128 who were recruited using the snowball
method129 and included principals, presidents, superintendents, and edu-
cation administrators from across the United States, primarily from New
England, the Midwest, the South, and the West Mountain region.  Roughly
half were women.  On average, they had twenty-six years of experience
working and managing religious institutions.  The interview data pro-
duced over twenty hours of audio and 400 pages of transcripts, which were
then coded and analyzed using the grounded theory approach.130  The
code list was developed and refined through iterative readings to capture
patterns and themes in the leaders’ discussion of conflict and to track the
avenues pursued in tackling conflict.  Additional data (mostly discussed in
Section II.C, infra) was collected from relevant cases, websites, public doc-
uments, and Christian media and forums.
Educational institutions were the focus for the sampling because of
their central normative function and the amount of conflict that they at-
tract and generate as a result of this function.131  First, religious communi-
128. The research was approved by the Harvard Institutional Research Board
(#F24214-101).  Interview transcripts are on file with the author.  The interviews
are part of a series of research projects on conflicts between law and religion.  A
previous project that examined the impact of antidiscrimination remedies on relig-
ious behavior was published in Barak-Corren, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 20.
129. The snowball method is a common technique used to gain access and
study insular populations. See Patrick Biernacki & Dan Waldorf, Snowball Sampling:
Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling, 10 SOC. METHODS & RES. 141, 152
(1981).  The sensitivity of the issues discussed (which included details on potential
breaches of law) and the rank of the targeted pool of interviewees required the use
of snowball sampling.  Prior to that, several attempts were made to recruit religious
managers on a broad basis through publicly available contact information, to no
avail.
130. BARNEY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED
THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967).  The Dedoose software
was used for the coding and analysis.  This method has been widely used in similar
studies. See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW:
STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998) (charting the ways people understand law and
engage with legal institutions); TOVA HARTMAN HALBERTAL, APPROPRIATELY SUBVER-
SIVE: MODERN MOTHERS IN TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS (2002) (a comparative study of
how Catholic and Jewish women reason about faith and feminism).
131. Barak-Corren, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 20 (surveying cases and
providing qualitative and quantitative experimental evidence on the extent of re-
ligious conflict in schools and the impact of antidiscrimination law on the dynamic
of conflict).  Conflicts have continued to accumulate since then. See infra notes
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ties view schools as non-state authorities132 and as strong guardians of
religious autonomy.  Schools are responsible for inculcating the next gen-
eration into the faith, instilling values and norms, and preparing children
for life as community members.133  At the same time, even private relig-
ious schools are bound by general antidiscrimination laws as employers
and contractors.134  Inconsistencies between religious commitments and
general law are a fertile ground for conflicts.135
The focus on Catholic educational institutions was also guided by
their particular relevance to conflicts between religion and equality.  Relig-
ious schools in general, and Catholic schools in particular, have been in-
volved in major legal and social “culture wars” in recent years over their
regulation and treatment of women, reproduction, and LGBTQ individu-
als.  Key examples (all of which involve Catholic schools) include the dis-
missal of pregnant out-of-wedlock teachers,136 dismissal of LGBTQ
teachers and students,137 and objections to providing contraceptive cover-
136–137 and accompanying text.  Notably, communities may navigate the conflict
differently in different contexts (e.g., schools, churches, for-profit corporations)
and dilemmas (e.g., LGBTQ issues, unmarried pregnancies, contraceptives).
132. Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be Free Speech in Public Schools?, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 59 (2008) (arguing that schools should be permitted to
govern themselves without government interference in order to protect the free-
dom of speech).
133. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 33 (1983)
(analyzing Bob Jones University as a normative community that regulates the pub-
lic and private conduct of its students); Caroline Mala Corbin, Expanding the Bob
Jones Compromise, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED
STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS 123 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012) (arguing that
the Bob Jones holding with respect to religious educational institutions should ex-
pand to invidious sex discrimination); see also infra note 130 and sources cited
therein.
134. See, e.g., cases cited supra, note 52.
135. See Cover, supra note 133; see also Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the
Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979); Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discrimi-
natory Religious Schools Observation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1982) (analyzing the ten-
sion between religious schools and antidiscrimination tax policy).
136. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316 (11th
Cir. 2012) (finding dismissal for conception three weeks prior to wedding may
proceed to trial); Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., No. 6:10-cv-871-ACC-
TBS, 2012 WL 5896367 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2012) (finding in favor of teacher);
Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1177 (N.D.
Ind. 2014); Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2013 WL 360355
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013); see also Dana Liebelson & Molly Redden, A Montana
School Just Fired a Teacher for Getting Pregnant. That Actually Happens All the Time.,
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/
catholic-religious-schools-fired-lady-teachers-being-pregnant/ [https://perma.cc/
SU8N-S63X] (depicting ten cases of unmarried pregnant women or women who
have used artificial insemination who were fired).
137. John Higgins & Lornet Turnbull, Eastside Catholic Students Rally Around
Ousted Vice Principal, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/eastside-catholic-students-rally-around-ousted-vice-principal/ [https:/
/perma.cc/DY5P-JKA3] (Seattle homosexual vice principle was dismissed for mar-
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age to employees as part of health insurance policy.138  Catholic schools
were dominant in all of these conflict categories, generating a large vol-
ume of disputes relating to LGBTQ and gender equality.  Whether as
plaintiffs seeking exemptions from governmental health mandates or as
respondents to discrimination allegations, the Church has been a major
player in the culture wars, alongside other players.139  Interviewing the
leaders of these institutions offered the possibility of learning from indi-
viduals who served as the regulators and enforcers of religious norms in
practice.  Some of these leaders were even involved in litigation of con-
crete conflicts.
There are advantages and limitations to the focus on Catholic leaders.
The unity of doctrine, structure and hierarchy of the Church across the
United States enabled the collection of data from a variety of geographical
areas (interviewing leaders from the South, North, Midwest, etc.) and le-
gal regimes (interviewing leaders operating under progressive and con-
servative legal regimes), while keeping the religious and functional
characteristics of the interviewees consistent and comparable.  This would
have been less attainable with Evangelical churches, for example, which
are dispersed around the nation and vary in doctrine, structure, and
schooling systems.  However, the absence of Evangelicals and other de-
nominations from the research is a significant limitation, which I address
in Section III.B.3, infra, where I discuss evidence of social impact regula-
rying his same-sex partner; this termination added to a list of more than fifteen
cases in about two years in which Christian institutions terminated LGBTQ em-
ployees for same-sex marriages or expressing support thereof); see also Woodard v.
Jupiter Christian Sch., Inc., 913 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (denying
appeal of gay student who was expelled after his teacher confronted him about his
sexual orientation by using the impact rule); Miami Teacher Says Catholic School Fired
Her for Marrying Woman, CBS NEWS (Feb. 12, 2018, 10:59 AM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/jocelyn-morffi-miami-teacher-fired-catholic-school-mar-
rying-woman/ [https://perma.cc/A2DN-WDNX] (lesbian teacher argues she was
fired after marrying her partner); Ken Bencomo, Gay Catholic Teacher Fired for Mar-
rying, Gets Huge Student Support, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2013, 12:00 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/13/gay-catholic-teacher-
fired_n_3749270.html [https://perma.cc/K5ER-GWJA] (Los Angeles Catholic
school teacher was fired after his marriage to his partner was published in newspa-
pers); Al Fischer, Gay Music Teacher Fired from Catholic School, Marries Partner in New
York, HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/11/al-fischer-
fired-gay-catholic-music-teacher-wedding-_n_1337482.html [https://perma.cc/
L6RN-T6R6] (last updated Feb. 2, 2016) (gay St. Louis music teacher at a Catholic
school was fired after marrying his partner in a civil ceremony in New York).
138. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).  Abortions and related medical
procedures are also hot-button issues. See Turic v. Holland Hosp., Inc., 85 F.3d
1211 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that dismissing a woman for considering an abor-
tion to protect religious sensibilities of her co-workers is illegal discrimination
under Title VII); Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir.
2006) (dismissing a Title VII claim of a Catholic school teacher who was fired after
adding her name to a pro-choice advertisement in a local newspaper).
139. Section I.A, supra, discusses the patchwork of decisions that culminated
from these cases.
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tion from additional denominations, including Baptists, Lutherans, adher-
ents of the Alliance Church, and Orthodox Jews.
In keeping with Austin, Sarat, and others,140 the approach in con-
ducting the interviews was to define conflict broadly, so as to include both
controversies that developed into legal cases and controversies that
evolved differently.  This is one of the important advantages of in-depth
qualitative fieldwork in the present context.  As various factors within relig-
ious communities suppress the evolvement of disputes into conflicts, delv-
ing inside religious institutions provides a unique perspective on the
reality of conflicts between religion and equality.
It should be noted at the outset that the objective of the qualitative
fieldwork was not to generate findings that would be statistically represen-
tative or immediately generalizable to other populations.141  In addition,
the interviews cannot answer causal questions and they cannot provide es-
timates of the magnitude of the effects of the uncovered factors.  Rather,
the goal of the qualitative study is to offer a rich theoretical understanding
of the phenomenon and generate hypotheses that could be quantitatively
tested in future work.142
Section III.C, infra, places the theory of social impact regulation in a
broader context and demonstrates how it illuminates a wide range of con-
flicts in relation to education, employment, health benefits, adoption ser-
vices, and social services, occurring in a range of religions and across
various loci.
III. GOVERNING THE CONFLICT: THE SOCIAL IMPACT REGULATION
OF EQUALITY CHALLENGES
This Part turns to exploring the internal perspectives and practices of
religious decision-makers with respect to the conflict between religion and
equality.  Section III.A describes the conflict as it is experienced by relig-
ious leaders: commonplace, agonizing, and occurring both between and
within cultures.  Section III.B then focuses on the question set forth in
Part I: What factors shape the religious response to the conflict and, par-
ticularly whether religion responds with opposition or tolerance to equal-
ity challenges?  I focus on one framework of factors, which I describe as
social impact regulation.
140. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 130; Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 115;
Miller & Sarat, supra note 114.
141. Mario Luis Small, ‘How Many Cases Do I Need?’: On Science and the Logic of
Case Selection in Field-Based Research, 10 ETHNOGRAPHY 5 (2009) (arguing that this
question is irrelevant to qualitative research and drawing the distinction between
mapping variation—which qualitative research does—and explaining variation, in
the sense of quantifying effects and establishing causality—which it does not).
142. I follow up on these hypotheses in a recent working paper that applies a
comparative lens to examine the “war within” theory, and social impact regulation
in particular, and uses experimental methods to answer questions of causality,
magnitude, and generalization, among other questions.
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A. The War, as Experienced from Within Religion
The big picture that emerges from the accounts of the Catholic lead-
ers—individuals who head institutions and education networks, oversee-
ing and engaging with hundreds of employees, students, and families—is
of a conflict, or “war,” that occurs both between religious culture and socie-
tal culture and within religion: within its communities, institutions, values,
and even within specific decision-makers.  The vast majority of the leaders
experienced conflicts between religion and equality as commonplace and
“really, really tough,”143 several using the word “nightmare.”144  The inter-
views indicated that conflicts over gender and sexuality were among the
primary tensions preoccupying the leaders, and that the most concerning
dilemmas (see Table 1) typically involved a choice between tolerating un-
married pregnancies and same-sex relationships and taking adverse action
against the perceived nonconformist (usually by terminating employment
or education).  Sixty-three percent (63%) of the leaders personally dealt
with or were concerned about LGBTQ issues, and 75% of them dealt with
or were concerned about unmarried pregnancy.145
Table 1: Types and Frequencies of Conflicts Discussed by Religious Leaders
Conflicts regarding… Share of concerned leaders 
LGBT issues 63%  
 LGBT teacher 44% 
 LGBT student 19% 
 LGBT parent 13% 
Pregnancy out of wedlock 75% 
 Of a teacher 56% 
 Of a student 25% 
 Of someone else 13% 
Other conflicts   
 The contraception mandate  31% 
 Illegal status of migrant students 6% 
Note: The table presents the share of leaders who described a specific 
case or an example of a conflict related to the category (either a past or 
present case).  To provide conservative estimates of the frequency of 
conflicts, only interviewees who raised the dilemmas independently of 
the interviewer and/or personally encountered these dilemmas were 
included.  N=17. 
143. Interview with Leader #9 (May 2014).
144. Interview with Leader #5 (Apr. 2014); Interview with Leader 13 (June
2014).
145. Additional gender-related conflicts included objections to the contracep-
tives mandate (some of the leaders I interviewed were involved in litigation against
the act themselves or through their institutions).
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These frequencies provide evidence of the intensity of the conflict
between religion and LGBTQ and gender equality within religious com-
munities.  Naturally, the preoccupation with sexuality was reflected in the
conflicts that the leaders described and the examples they provided.  As a
result, many of the following pages deal with the response of religious in-
stitutions to conflicts concerning LGBTQ issues and unmarried preg-
nancy.  And the leaders often alluded to the socio-cultural aspect of these
conflicts, saying that “Catholic schools are counter-culture”146 and that
“part of the cultural problem, issue, struggle, is that the Church has always
lived in a pluralistic world.”147  The intensity of the conflict was almost a
cause for anxiety.  Mr. Tobin,148 the president of a Catholic high school in
the Midwest, was particularly apprehensive of the day he would have to
deal with a public coming-out of a gay teacher:
There is going to be in [the area] a precedent-setting case, and I
think every Catholic school, and this has come up through the
Association of Catholic Schools Presidency in the area [refers to
the local Catholic Education Association] and in conversation, I
think every school hopes that it’s not their school that is the first
to see what that precedent will result in, but we all know that
we’re facing this same dilemma.149
Indeed, most leaders viewed the trend toward equality and antidis-
crimination as emerging from the general society, and therefore external
in origin—a conflict between liberal culture and Catholic culture.  Yet the
ideas and values the equality trend brought forth were gradually penetrat-
ing religious boundaries, transforming the conflict from external to inter-
nal.  The values at stake have also shifted from secular ones of equality and
non-discrimination to religious values of compassion, forgiveness for sin,
evangelism (requiring inclusion), humility (“we are all sinners”), kindness,
and love.150  For example, Ms. Peterson, a principal, had a record of not
expelling or dismissing individuals for pregnancy out of wedlock, abor-
tion, or gay relationships.151  Her philosophy was that, “Although we can-
not support the decision that you made, we can support you” and “[w]e
believe that God may not love the sin, but he always loves the sinner.  And,
we can do no less.”152  One administrator overseeing many school districts
146. Interview with Leader #5 (Apr. 2014).
147. Interview with Leader #14 (June 2014).
148. Throughout this Article, I use pseudonyms when I quote extensively
from the interviews.  Otherwise, I provide references to interviewee number.
149. Interview with Leader #13 (June 2014).
150. In previous work, I described in greater length the transformation of the
conflict from external to internal and raised hypotheses regarding the relationship
between this internalization of conflict and the application of more inclusive poli-
cies towards perceived sexual nonconformists. See Barak-Corren, Antidiscrimination
Law, supra note 20, at 984–86.
151. Interview with Leader #8 (May 2014).
152. Id.
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described “bishops that say, ‘No, we are going to forgive them.  They can
still teach.  They have health insurance.  They didn’t have an abortion.
That’s a good thing.  So we’re going to fully support them.’”153
The internalization of the conflict and of equality challenges does not
mean that compassion and evangelism were transforming opposition and
exclusion to tolerance and inclusion under all circumstances.  A dominant
consideration that influenced the response to equality challenges was the
anticipated social impact of the perceived nonconformity—resulting in so-
cial impact regulation, which I describe next.
B. Social Impact Regulation
The response of the educational leaders to the challenges posed by
perceived sexual nonconformity systematically varied between opposition
and tolerance based on social impact concerns.  These concerns were
predicated on the belief that normative deviations create a risk that others
will follow suit and erode the religious norm.  Accordingly, conditions that
define the nonconformist’s scope of social impact—specifically, his or her
role and sphere of action—guided the application of religious norms to
particular conflicts.
Social impact regulation is far from strict enforcement and as a result,
it simultaneously increases tolerance and inclusion and places limitations
on individuals’ ability to express themselves within the community.  Sec-
tion III.B.1 describes the sphere factor; Section III.B.2 describes the role
factor; and Section III.B.3 places social impact regulation in a broader
context, discussing its implementation in additional settings and by addi-
tional denominations.
1. Sphere as a Dynamic Tool: Privatizing to Avoid Conflict
The Catholic leaders divided the world into public and private
spheres, each ruled by different standards.  For the leaders, schools were
the prototype of the public sphere: a public enterprise, a common space
through which people express and realize their faith.  Therefore, religious
schools ought to be administered according to the teachings of the
Church, and in a way that is publicly observable.
In contrast to the high standards expected in the public sphere, the
leaders tended to tolerate sexual nonconformity in the private sphere, as
long as the nonconformist continued observing religious norms in the
public eye.  As principal Peterson put it:
A teacher may never bring public scandal or publicly behave in a
way that is contrary to the teachings of the church. . . .  And there
have been teachers that I know are gay, that have lived very, to
the best of my knowledge, celibate lives.  They have been nothing
but outstanding role models of professionalism and care to our
153. Interview with Leader #2 (Feb. 2014).
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students.  I can tell you that, sadly, there have been instances
where I have had to let a teacher go.  Not because of sexual ori-
entation, or because they were living with a fiancée or engaged in
a relationship. But that they made that public.  You know, I never
went witch-hunting to find out how my teachers were living.  But
if they really made it a public issue, and it became publicly
known, then I had no choice.154
The view that private nonconformity is tolerable but public noncon-
formity requires religious enforcement was widely shared.  Mr. Jefferson, a
superintendent of schools, emphasized that the decision to forego relig-
ious enforcement in the private sphere was deliberate:
We do not go unnecessarily prying into our teachers’ and admin-
istrators’ personal lives.  We don’t want to peek through bed-
room windows, and living room windows. We don’t want to know
too much.  And we’re not going to act on something that we don’t
know, obviously.155
Peterson and Jefferson describe a common feature of the public/pri-
vate distinction: refraining from knowing, or willful ignorance.  In addi-
tion, Catholic leaders also created policies intended to hide religious
nonconformity, thereby making it “private.”  That way, the public/private
distinction became a dynamic tool that leaders used to turn a prohibited
conduct into a permissible conduct, or at least tolerable conduct.
One principal described his policy with respect to same-sex marriage
as, “let’s just make sure that an e-mail or an invitation [to the wedding]
doesn’t go out to every faculty member . . . that the employee is respectful
of the teachings of the church and is not bringing his partner to these
events.”156  As applied to the case of unmarried pregnancy, one adminis-
trator explained, “You could put somebody on leave; they could take the
person out of the classroom and put them in another position.”157  These
policies were used as alternatives to dismissal—solutions that keep non-
conformists in the system.
154. Interview with Leader #8 (May 2014) (emphasis added).
155. Interview with Leader #17 (July 2014) (emphasis added).  Similar state-
ments were made by Leader #5 (Apr 2014); Leader 8 (May 2014); Leader #11
(June 2014); Leader #16 (June 2014).
156. Interview with Leader #13 (June 2014).  A policy regulating all Catholic
schools in Arkansas also alludes to the distinction in prohibiting students from
publicly advocating or expressing same-sex attraction “in such a way as to cause
confusion or distraction in the context of Catholic school classes, activities, or
events.” DIOCESE OF LITTLE ROCK, ADDENDA TO THE MANUAL OF POLICIES AND REGU-
LATIONS FOR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY CATHOLIC SCHOOLS OF ARKANSAS 2, http:/
/www.lrchs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Addendum-to-Handbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L39C-GQDC] (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
157. Interview with Leader #5 (Apr. 2014).  Additional examples provided by
Leader #6 (May 2014); Leader #7 (May 2014); Leader #8 (May 2014); Leader #13
(June 2014).
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The application of the public/private distinction is dynamic—it be-
gins with the notion that the school is a public religious sphere, yet contin-
ues with the formation of islands of privacy within the public sphere,
contained in private discussions between nonconforming individuals and
their supervisors.158  This policy thus clearly resembles “don’t ask, don’t
tell,” but its focus is not about the process of communication—as neither
asking or telling seem to be the main issue—but about the bottom line
publicity of nonconformity.  In other words, leaders appeared to craft poli-
cies that tolerated nonconformists who “told” them about their noncon-
formity, as long as they did not make it broadly public.
Why were public/private policies enacted?  The interviews shed some
light on this question.  One major concern underlying the regulation of
sexual nonconformity was its potential social impact, and public noncon-
formity was more worrying on that regard.  First, the leaders repeatedly
voiced concerns over what students might think and do if news of the non-
conformity will spread.  As one superintendent said: “To have an educator,
somebody who’s forming the moral beliefs of our young, engage in a pub-
lic act, or speak in direct opposition of the church, is a problem.”159  Sec-
ond, public nonconformity required a public response against the
violation, otherwise the community might infer that the norm had weak-
ened.  As one administrator said: “we don’t want children to think there
are no consequences for engaging in sin.”160  Several educators cited a
concern that students would follow a pregnant teacher’s lead and engage
in nonmarital sexual relationships.161  Third, public nonconformity could
harm the relationship between the institution and the parents.  As Mr.
O’Malley said:
Certainly we exist as a private enterprise because people . . .
would prefer the private enterprise compared to the public one.
And when I choose to send my children to a Catholic school,
then my expectations are that the employees there are going to
158. Many educational leaders suggested similar DADT solutions.  Some vari-
ation existed regarding the “don’t ask” component.  Some supported the prohibi-
tion on asking (Leader #11 (June 2014); Leader #15 (June 2014)), others thought
schools are entitled to ask (Leader #3 (Mar. 2014); Leader #4 (Mar. 2014); Leader
#7 (May 2014); Leader #8 (May 2014)).  Notably, DADT-like solutions were one
component of social impact regulation, in addition to privatization, role distinc-
tions, role transfers, and more.
159. Interview with Leader #17 (July 2014).  I address the significance of the
role of the nonconformist in Section III.B, infra.  Similarly, Tova Hartman
Halbertal  describes a conversation between a Catholic teacher and her Bishop,
who told her: “[w]e can have the biggest argument you’ve ever had in your life.
But when we go out there, it has to be a cheery ‘Aye-aye, sir’ . . . we have to present
a united front.  We teach what the Church teaches.” HALBERTAL, supra note 130, at
114.  Hartman interprets that the Bishop “did not want to silence her as an individ-
ual woman, only as the teacher of Catholic girls.” Id.
160. Interview with Leader #9 (May 2014).
161. Interview with Leader #16 (June 2014); Interview with Leader #17 (July
2014).
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teach the children the Catholic faith.  And they’re going to ex-
emplify that in their public life.  And when that is in conflict,
we’re in conflict.162
Interestingly, Catholic leaders did not cite canon law or doctrine in
any specific manner.  Yet their use of the private/public distinction and
their particular concern for social impact resonates with several contem-
porary discussions in the Church.  A recent application of public/private
distinctions to facilitate the inclusion of sinners in the community appears
in the Buenos Aires and Rome guidelines regarding remarried and di-
vorced couples.  The Buenos Aires Bishops wrote that
It may be right for eventual access to sacraments to take place
privately, especially where situations of conflict might arise.  But at
the same time, we have to accompany our communities in their
growing understanding and welcome, without this implying creat-
ing confusion about the teaching of the Church on the indissoluble
marriage.163
These guidelines were endorsed by the Pope, and the Rome diocese
followed suit, allowing the communion to take place “in a discreet man-
ner,” “but not however in the case in which, for example, [the couple’s]
condition is shown off ostentatiously as if it were part of the Christian
ideal, etc.”164  Notably, the public/private distinction is not articulated as
a formal rule in these documents; nevertheless, it has guided the develop-
ment of the Catholic response to challenges of nonconformity and
inclusion.
In conclusion, the findings chart a systematic variation in the leaders’
response to and regulation of gender and sexual nonconformity.  Catholic
leaders drew on the public/private distinction to form their responses to
equality challenges, such that the distinction moderated the emergence
and escalation of conflict.  Social impact concerns were related to the deci-
sion to strictly enforce religious norms and to the decisions to relax en-
forcement, tolerate nonconformity, and even actively assist it.  Hence,
private/public policies served both as a form of risk regulation and as a
conditional means of inclusion.  Furthermore, the leaders often impli-
cated themselves in the protection of nonconformity through “privatizing”
162. Interview with Leader #16 (June 2014).
163. Buenos Aires Bishops’ Guidelines on Amoris Laetitia: Full Text, CATHOLIC
VOICES COMMENT para. 9 (Sept. 18, 2016), https://cvcomment.org/2016/09/18/
buenos-aires-bishops-guidelines-on-amoris-laetitia-full-text/ [https://perma.cc/
2R4C-VGRV] (emphasis added).
164. This policy is referred to as “the internal forum” or “foro interno.”  The
original text in Italian reads “in maniera riservata” and “ma non invece nel caso in
cui, ad esempio, viene ostentata la propria condizione come se facesse parte
dell’ideale cristiano, ecc.” See “La Letizia dell’amore: il Cammino Delle famiglie a
Roma”. Relazione del Cardinale Vicario a Conclusione del Convegno Pastorale Della Diocesi
di Roma del 2016 (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.gliscritti.it/blog/entry/3884
[https://perma.cc/K998-T2CA].
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it or deliberately ignoring it (e.g., by temporarily relocating unmarried
pregnant teachers to less public positions, making sure that wedding invi-
tations do not find their way to antagonistic faculty members, or refusing
to investigate “allegations” of sexual nonconformity).  This practice in par-
ticular emphasizes the tension between the normative premise of the lead-
ers—that sexuality norms are binding and that the school has a role in
enforcing them—and the path of selective enforcement that they ulti-
mately chose to apply.  It is noteworthy that uses of the distinction varied.
Some thought that carving a discreet solution would be easier in the
LGBTQ case than in the pregnancy case, as principal Scott explained:
Well, it’s one of those things where it’s very hard to hide some-
one who’s pregnant.  But if you were living, you know, you just
give me your address, I don’t go to your house as your employer
and check who you’re living with.  But the same way if someone
was having sex out of marriage, I wouldn’t know that unless,
there’s no reason as their employer I would find that out unless
somehow that were to become public.  Yeah, I think if someone
was gay it would be easier to hide than a pregnancy in the
building.165
Another important source of variation was the role of the noncon-
formist, to which I turn now.
2. Role: Heightened Positions Come with Less Tolerance
Challenges to the normative order can come from various constitu-
ents of the religious community.  In recent years, teachers, coaches,166 caf-
eteria operators,167 and students168 argued that they were discriminated
against by religious (often Catholic) schools based on their sexual orienta-
tion.  These cases suggest that being openly gay and particularly being in a
165. Interview with Leader #11 (June 2014); Interview with Leader #12 (June
2014).
166. See supra, note 137.  This is not a complete list.  Additional episodes are
detailed, e.g., in Michael Paulson, Gay Marriages Confront Catholic School Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/us/gay-marriages-
confront-catholic-school-rules.html [https://perma.cc/2Q2F-R7AX].
167. Milton J. Valencia, Gay Married Man Says Catholic School Rescinded Job Offer,




168. Gay Teen Wins Fight over Catholic Prom, CBC NEWS (May 22, 2002, 5:05
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/gay-teen-wins-fight-over-catholic-prom-
1.348831 [https://perma.cc/P3R7-UCP5] (describing a Catholic school decision
that an LGBTQ student is prohibited from bringing a same-sex date to the school
prom); Maura Dolan, School Wins Bias Case Ruling, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2009, 12:00
AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/28/local/me-school28 [https://
perma.cc/2KBP-7RFJ] (describing a case involving a Lutheran school that dis-
missed two students for having “a bond of intimacy” that was “characteristic of a
lesbian relationship”).
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same-sex relationship mark the exit sign for LGBTQ individuals.  The data
suggest a more nuanced answer.  In addition to the sphere of noncon-
formity, the role of the nonconformist was relevant to the application and
enforcement of religious norms (and, indeed, public allegations by teach-
ers and coaches appear to be more prevalent than cafeteria workers).  The
common distinction in the data was between teachers and students.
Clearly, there are many reasons to differentiate these populations.  Firstly,
students are young and may be perceived as fragile, and thus in greater
need of aid and counsel.169  Secondly, leaders may perceive students as
malleable and “not fully formed,”170 and thus better candidates for reha-
bilitation than adult teachers.171  Lenient treatment might be motivated
by hopes to bring students into conformity.172  Students are also expected to
deviate from the norms, as this is what students typically do.173  Finally,
schools also depend on the business of students and parents, which may
lead them to factor their interests and (perceived) preferences into the
enforcement policy.174
These are all reasons that can contribute to the distinction between
students and teachers.  Yet another dimension of the teacher–student dis-
tinction is the particular relationship between role and social impact.  Spe-
cifically, the religious leaders viewed (some) roles as more influential than
others and more likely to shape community norms.  Teaching in particular
was considered as a position of social impact.  The Catholic leaders per-
ceived teachers as “role models” who must exemplify the ideal of religious
life through good deeds and personal conduct.175  This power came with
stricter regulation, because the leaders believed that teacher nonconform-
ity could confuse students and even inspire the same behavior in stu-
dents.176  Superintendent O’Malley elaborated on the social impact
concern that was particularly relevant to teachers:  “It’s very difficult to
expect a student to learn from a person who says that abstinence is the
169. Interview with Leader #8 (May 2014); Interview with Leader #9 (May
2014).
170. Interview with Leader #9 (May 2014).
171. Id.
172. Interview with Leader #17 (July 2014).  Preferences for “rehabilitation”
over exclusion could be related to the more general interest of the community to
retain its members and preserve its integrity.  I discuss this explanation in Part V,
infra.
173. Relatedly, teaching is supposed to guide and correct for errors.  There-
fore, students who deviate might actually reinforce the system and act within its
behavioral norms.
174. Interview with Leader #16 (June 2014).
175. These views were expressed by all leaders and were especially dominant
in the interviews with Leader #2 (Feb. 2014); Leader #5 (Apr. 2014); Leader #6
(May 2014); Leader #7 (May 2014); Leader #9 (May 2014); Leader #11 (June
2014); Leader #12 (June 2014); Leader #14 (June 2014); Leader #16 (June 2014).
176. Interviews with Leader #7 (May 2014); Leader #9 (May 2014); Leader
#14 (June 2014); Leader #16 (June 2014); Leader #17 (July 2014).
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only moral way we can live our lives, and yet they don’t practice what they
are teaching children.”177
The regulation of pregnancy out of wedlock exemplifies the role dis-
tinction.  According to the interviews, when a teacher became pregnant
out of wedlock, some consequence typically followed.  Teachers were dis-
missed,178 put on leave (with or without pay),179 moved to a back-office
position for the duration of the pregnancy,180 or even encouraged to
marry.181  Students, in contrast, were almost always kept in school and
counseled throughout their pregnancy.  Ms. Peterson, a retired superin-
tendent and principal, illustrated this point.  Referring to teen pregnancy
among students, she said:
I had three girls that year that were pregnant.  All three of them
were permitted to remain in school. . . .  And then, I also know
that it was around that same time . . . that a student came out to
our senior counselor, that she was gay.  And our senior counselor
worked with her throughout the year.  And again, there was no
talk of dismissing her.182
Yet when Ms. Peterson was asked about the response to a teacher in a
similar condition, she clarified that a teacher should “absolutely” be termi-
nated because her job obliges her to “not bring public scandal or to be-
have in a way that’s contrary to the teachings of the faith.”183  Opposite
reactions to nonconforming teachers and students were commonly shared
among the leaders.  “One’s a role model, one isn’t”184—succinctly cap-
tures the thrust of this approach.
The role-based distinction operated similarly, and for the same rea-
sons, in sexual identity cases.  The picture emerging from the interviews
was that all other things being equal, LGBTQ students were more likely to
be kept part of the school community whereas teachers were more likely
to be excluded.  Mr. Jefferson, a superintendent, justified the decision of
another archdiocese to dismiss the vice principal who married his boy-
friend in Zmuda:
177. Interview with Leader #16 (June 2014).
178. Interviews with Leader #1 (Feb. 2014); Leader #9 (May 2014); Leader
#12 (June 2014); Leader #17 (July 2014).
179. Interviews with Leader #1 (Feb. 2014); Leader #5 (Apr. 2014); Leader #6
(May 2014); Leader #8 (May 2014); Leader #9 (May 2014).
180. Interviews with Leader #6 (May 2014); Leader #7 (May 2014); Leader
#17 (July 2014).
181. This was discussed as a desired solution by Leader #8 (May 2014) and
Leader #12 (June 2014).
182. Interview with Leader #8 (May 2014); see also Interview with Leader #9
(May 2014) (“I don’t know of any Catholic school who will not let a pregnant
student attend.  They all do, as far as I know.”).
183. Interview with Leader #8 (May 2014).
184. Interview with Leader #9 (May 2014).
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To have somebody who is working with young people, particu-
larly in a leadership role, who signed a contract that clearly says
that he was asked to support and live up to the teachings of the
church.  I can see why the archdiocese had to take that step [of
dismissing him].185
At the same time, Mr. Jefferson’s approach to students who come out
as LGBTQ was careful and tolerant, as was Ms. Peterson’s.  He did not
hold students to the same normative standards as teachers.186
The implications of the role distinction for students often implied a
counseling, rehabilitative approach.187  This approach did not forsake the
validity of religious norms, but it altered their application and mode of
enforcement.  Instead of grounds for punishment and exclusion (as ap-
plied to teachers) the norms served as a source of guidance in the case of
students.  Notably, while leaders were concerned, to some degree, from
students’ negative influence on one another, they did not see the stu-
dents’ impact as a concern sufficiently strong to require expulsion.  It ap-
peared that students were not expected to model the norm and therefore
their nonconformity did not trigger the same perceived social risks.188
Social impact regulation, in its focus on role, reflects once again a
systematic variation in the application of religious norms.  A rule that
“needs to be enforced” on one category of people is reinterpreted for an-
other.  The application of the role rule also varied between leaders.  On
the expansive side of the role model argument we find leaders, including
Ms. Fordham and Ms. Peterson, who did not distinguish between teachers
of religious and secular subjects and expanded the role model category to
virtually every school employee,189 and even parents,190  arguing that who-
185. Mr. Jefferson was affiliated with a different archdiocese than the one that
fired Mr. Zmuda and so he was commenting on the case from an outsider’s per-
spective.  In his discussions of similar conflicts in his own archdiocese, he referred
to the decision-making process in terms of “we” and “our.”
186. Interview with Leader #17 (July 2014) (“[I]f you are gay, and even if you
are in a homosexual relationship, . . . you’re not going to get expelled.  There’s
probably going to be no formal punishment exacted against you.”).
187. Interviews with Leader #5 (Apr. 2014); Leader #6 (May 2014); Leader #7
(May 2014); Leader #9 (May 2014); Leader #11 (June 2014); Leader #17 (July
2014).
188. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.  Note that it is unclear
whether this assumption is accurate or not.  Students may have considerable influ-
ence on their peers, and teachers may exert little influence, depending on the
circumstances.
189. Interviews with Leader #8 (May 2014) (describing how the morality
clause applies to “every single person who works within our school community”);
Leader #9 (May 2014) (“I don’t think there’s a difference between teachers and
other employees.  I think they’re all pretty much treated the same way.  I’ve not
seen differences in my, the schools I’ve been associated with, if a teacher’s assistant
or a cafeteria worker became pregnant out of wedlock, she would be treated the
same way as a teacher who became pregnant out of wedlock.”).
190. Interview with Leader #2 (Feb. 2014) described a pastor that revoked the
admission of a child after learning that he had two mothers (“he was not willing to
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ever might be posing a risk of social impact should be removed.  These
accounts did not distinguish, as legal doctrine often does, between em-
ployees who hold active religious roles (for example, “called” teachers who
lead students in prayer)191 and employees in back-office positions or lay
teachers of secular subjects.192  On the narrow side of the argument we
find leaders who did not subscribe to expansive interpretations of the role
model category and allowed LGBTQ parents to enroll children in their
institutions.193  Interestingly, some leaders explicitly noted that sexual
nonconformity should not serve as grounds for dismissal in non-educa-
tional settings, where employees are not expected to serve as models of
religious norms for others to follow.194
3. Social Impact Regulation in Context
The findings from the qualitative fieldwork shed light on the exis-
tence of systematic variation in the religious regulation of sexual noncon-
formity.  In contrast to culture war analyses, conservative religious leaders
do not rush to secure a license to discriminate whenever they encounter
sexual nonconformity in their institutions.  They also do not perceive the
values involved as necessarily incommensurable.  Instead, they attempt to
find accommodations on the ground, drawing on distinctions of sphere
and role in an attempt to square traditional and liberal norms, often rea-
soning their actions in terms of compassion, forgiveness, evangelism, and
humility.
There are two overlapping concerns about social impact underlying
this regulation.  First, the leaders believe that normative deviations create
a risk that others might follow suit, and therefore conditions that vary the
nonconformist’s scope of influence—her role and the sphere in which she
acts—are relevant to the application of the norm.  Second, the leaders
believe that role and sphere create or strengthen an obligation to respond
to nonconformity in ways that affirm the religious norm, otherwise its so-
cial status could decline.
While both sphere and role distinctions are rooted in concerns that
perceived nonconformity might spread, they also allow it to persist.  As a
run events where the two mothers would come.  And he just thought that was a bad
role model”); the child ultimately enrolled in another Catholic school in town that
did accept him.
191. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012) (holding that the ADA does not apply in the case of a
“called teacher”).
192. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch. Inc., 680 F.3d 1316,
1319–20 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that antidiscrimination law applies in the case
of a lay teacher).
193. Interview with Leader #17 (July 2014) (“[W]e have a policy on the books
indicating that parents who are in a same sex relationship are allowed to enroll
their students in our schools.”).
194. Interviews with Leader #5 (Apr. 2014); Leader #1 (Feb. 2014); Leader #9
(May 2014); Leader #16 (June 2014).
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result, social impact regulation simultaneously narrows the expression of
sexual nonconformists and increases tolerance towards sexual noncon-
formity in religious institutions.
As the remainder of this Part demonstrates, these findings elucidate a
phenomenon that appears to exist in a wider context.  Indeed, there is
evidence to suggest that social impact regulation occurs in additional are-
nas of conflict and is operated by additional religious groups.
First, social impact regulation is employed in a wide range of contexts,
including education, employment, healthcare, adoption services, and so-
cial services.  Education and employment in educational institutions were
discussed in the qualitative fieldwork.  The implications of social impact
regulation for healthcare are exemplified in the San Francisco contro-
versy.195  Recall that the Catholic Church and the city entered a dispute
regarding the city’s intention to oblige its contracting parties to provide
health insurance to same-sex partners.196  The parties managed to bridge
their differences only when a privacy-based solution was formed.197  The
ingredients of social impact regulation were all present in this case.  Like
the educational leaders who did not want “to know too much,”198 the
Archbishop did not want to “know” and erected a wall of privacy that facili-
tated tolerance and avoided the public erosion of the Church’s norms.199
An identical policy, for identical reasons, was adopted by the Catholic
Church in Michigan in 2016, in response to marriage equality and pres-
sures to offer health benefits to same-sex partners.200  Also in Michigan,
the agreement was presented as a compromise, “[d]ue to recent changes
in federal law . . . [t]he inclusion of the LDA (Legally Domiciled Adults)
benefit allows for the MCC health plan to be both legally compliant and
consistent with Church teaching.”201  This recent adoption of social im-
pact regulation in the healthcare context shows its continued viability and
relevance.
Social impact regulation played the same role, albeit with an opposite
outcome, in the Boston adoption services controversy.  There, the
Church’s adoption agencies placed children with same-sex parents as long
as this was kept under the radar but ceased to do so after the practice was
exposed publicly.202  The publicity of the information required the
Church to clarify its stance regarding same-sex relationships, and the
195. See supra Section I.C; supra notes 98–102 and specifically Minow, supra
note 1, at 829–44.
196. Minow, supra note 1, at 829–31.
197. Id. at 831.
198. Interview with Leader #17 (July 2014).
199. See id.
200. Niraj Warikoo, Catholic Church in Michigan May Expand Health Care to Gay




202. See Minow, supra note 1, at 832–38.
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Archbishop felt unable to deviate from canon law explicitly.203  Even so,
other dioceses were willing to adopt a referral policy to agencies that
placed with same-sex families, seeking to avoid knowledge of concrete
placements.204  However, the Massachusetts government declined this
compromise.205
The social impact lens also illuminates the chain of events in Pedreira
v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children,206 which involved an Evangelical in-
stitution.207  Pedreira, a lesbian, was employed at the charity as a thera-
pist.208  In her job interview, she was informed that her sexual orientation
was not a problem, but should be kept discreet.209  In August 1998, a pho-
tograph of Pedreira wearing a t-shirt that read “Isle of Lesbos,” alongside
her girlfriend, was exhibited at a local fair unbeknownst to her.210  The
exhibition lead to Pedreira’s termination, with the Kentucky Baptist
Holmes for Children (KBHC) citing concerns that her employment “was
sending the wrong message to kids.”211  The charity transferred Pedreira
to do office work and attempted to help her find another job—common
practices among the Catholic leaders in this study.212  Pedreira, by her
account, was hurt and did not want to cooperate with these attempts.213
Notably, there was no legal prohibition on sexual orientation discrimina-
tion applicable to Pedreira’s claim and so her case ultimately failed in
court.214
Pedreira is made of all the ingredients of social impact regulation, but
these were never at the forefront of the analysis.215  In fact, perhaps be-
203. See id.
204. See id. at 838.
205. See id.
206. 186 F. Supp. 2d 757 (W.D. Ky. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 579 F.3d
722 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 935 (2011).
207. Id. (dismissing Pedreira’s discrimination claim).
208. MICHAEL L. JONES, SECOND-HAND STORIES: 15 PORTRAITS OF LOUISVILLE
122–23 (2006).
209. Minow, supra note 1, at 809 (citing Interview with Alice Pedreira by Peo-
ple for the American Way, http://archives.wbur.org/insideout/documentaries/
faith/pop/pedreira.html [https://perma.cc/A89A-CC4C] (last visited May 22,
2020)).
210. Id.
211. JONES, supra note 208, at 114.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, 579 F.3d 722, 728 (6th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 935 (2011).  At the time, Kentucky did not have a state
law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in private employ-
ment.  Louisville, the locus of events, eventually enacted an ordinance prohibiting
discrimination, 1999 Louisville Code § 98.06, today Louisville Metro American Or-
dinance § 92.06 (2004).  Following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zarda,
discussed supra note 36, employment sexual orientation discrimination is prohib-
ited nationally.
215. Previous analyses of this case focused on the rights gap between the pub-
lic and the private sector, see David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, Out-
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cause the court was unsure what to make of KBHC’s original decision to
employ Pedreira despite knowing about her sexual orientation, this fact
was entirely omitted from the record.216  Against the background of this
Article, this puzzle is solved as Pedreira becomes part of a broader phenom-
enon that cuts across religions, organizations, services, and employment
contexts.
Pedreira also draws attention to the deeper implications of the sphere
distinction.  Pedreira did not publicize her sexuality at work, nor did her
co-workers peek through her bedroom windows.  Instead, a photographer,
a stranger to her, “outed” her.  In a somewhat similar case, a teacher in
Ohio was dismissed after her same-sex relationship was made public in an
obituary.217  These cases might be rare examples, but they clarify that so-
cial impact regulation is not necessarily a function of the nonconformist’s
conduct.  Even if the person and the institution are both interested in the
pact of social impact regulation, their success ultimately hinges on the ac-
tual state of affairs—a status—whether the parties choose it or not.
The wide reach of social impact regulation is also evident from the
range of religions and jurisdictions in which it appears.  It is applied by
religious institutions in liberal states (e.g., San Francisco and Boston) as
well as conservative ones (e.g., Kentucky, Ohio,218 and Florida219) that
either enacted or did not enact antidiscrimination prohibitions.  It ap-
pears in the Catholic church, the Baptist church,220 the Lutheran
sourcing the Constitution and Administrative Law Norms, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADM. 103,
105 (2005), and the question of public funding of and contracting with private
entities engaged in discrimination, see Regina N. Kaley, Note, Can Taxpayers Stand
Discrimination: Lack of Standing and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Permits the
Executive Branch to Fund Discrimination Within Religious Organizations, 49 J. CATHOL.
LEG. STUD. 195 (2010); Laura B. Mutterperl, Note, Employment at (God’s) Will: The
Constitutionality of Antidiscrimination Exemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation, 37
HARV. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 389 (2002).
216. Pedreira, 579 F.3d at 856 (stating that “the decision to terminate her was
made after . . . her lesbian lifestyle became known to KBHC” and emphasizing
KBHC’s formal policy that “[h]omosexuality is a lifestyle that would prohibit em-
ployment”).  The court never mentions the fact that her lifestyle actually became
known to her employers at KBHC at the time she was employed, not only after the
publication of her photo.
217. Meredith Bennett-Smith, Carla Hale, Gay Teacher, Fired from Catholic High
School After Being “Outed” by Mother’s Obituary, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2013),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/18/carla-hale-gay-fired-teacher-catho-
lic-high-school_n_3103853.html [https://perma.cc/5QU4-MMTL] (last updated
Feb. 2, 2016) (Ohio lesbian teacher was fired after the name of her female domes-
tic partner was included among the survivors in a newspaper obituary).
218. Id.
219. See infra note 222.  This is of course a partial list.  The examples through-
out this Part and this Section come from additional states.
220. Pedreira, 579 F.3d 722.
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church,221 the Alliance church,222 and so on.  In a previous work, I found
widespread use of the sphere and role distinctions—for the same purposes
and with the same consequences—by leaders of Orthodox Jewish institu-
tions in Israel.223  Orthodox Jewish leaders also privatize perceived sexual
nonconformity and distinguish between roles for the purposes of mitigat-
ing the conflict between religion and equality.224  Overall, we see evidence
of social impact regulation across religions, including in Evangelical and
Jewish denominations, and in conservative and progressive legal regimes.
While social impact regulation appears to be woven into the fabric of
many conflicts involving equality challenges, it cannot explain the entire
variation of the religious response to these challenges.  First, some institu-
tions might not take social impact into account and employ a stricter ver-
sion of the doctrine.  In other contexts, social impact regulation could be
dormant or hard to detect.
Consider, for example, the behavior of business owners refusing ser-
vice to same-sex weddings.225  This is clearly a different context—involving
private business owners and for-profit activities, among other distinctions.
Social impact regulation could still be relevant to this domain, but its im-
pact may be confounded with other factors.  For example, religious busi-
ness owners might apply sphere distinctions such that they sell or provide
services to same-sex couples in private festivities, but not in public events.
Consider the florist Barronelle Stutzman, who served Curt Freed and Rob
Ingersoll for nine years, including on anniversaries and Valentine’s Days,
but refused to arrange their wedding flowers.226  Stutzman’s behavior ap-
221. Aviva Shen, Gay Teen Says School Threatened to Expel Him, THINK PROGRESS
(Feb. 7, 2015, 3:35 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/gay-teen-says-school-
threatened-to-expel-him-36cc089cb2f6/ [https://perma.cc/VN75-PGVW] (report-
ing on an interaction between a student who posted videos on YouTube about
being gay and his principal who instructed him to delete them (thereby returning
to “private” state) or leave the school because “[w]e cannot have you promoting a
sinful lifestyle on air to the public.”  The school’s policy was identical, at least on
paper, with respect to promoting bisexual activity).
222. Same-Sex Couple’s Kids Denied Enrollment into Christian Preschool, NBC2 (Jan.
6, 2016, 11:00 PM), http://www.nbc-2.com/story/30904823/ same-sex-couples-
kids-denied-enrollment-into-christian-preschool [https://perma.cc/E7VH-NM8W]
(reporting the refusal of a Florida branch to enroll the children of a same-sex
family in preschool).  The principal allowed their admission at first but then de-
nied it, and the pastor cited social impact concerns: “[f]or us to have two men
coming every day, we feel like it would adversely affect the other kids.” Id. (emphasis
added)).
223. See Barak-Corren, Beyond Dissent, supra note 126.
224. Id. at 306–11 (describing findings from in-depth interviews with forty-
one Orthodox leaders and discussing their use of the sphere and role distinction
as withdrawal of religious normativity from arenas of conflict with the law).
225. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (regarding a baker who refused to create a wedding cake for a
gay couple); Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (regard-
ing a florist who refused to create flower arrangements for a gay wedding).
226. See Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1210–11 (Wash.
2019).  Ms. Stutzman also argued that she hires LGBTQ employees and serves
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pears to be consistent with a distinction between private and public events.
Furthermore, the prism of social impact regulation provides a theoretical
explanation to the emergence of wedding disputes as a central category of
religion–equality conflicts.  The dominance of wedding conflicts becomes
predictable once we appreciate the importance of sphere considerations
and the inherently public nature of weddings.  Because there is no obvious
way to privatize a wedding, avoiding conflict in these cases becomes more
difficult—and wedding conflicts proliferate.
At the same time, and for the same reason, it is also difficult to prove
the theory of social impact regulation in the context of weddings.  This is
because weddings do not have a clearly equivalent private counterfactual
that would enable the examination of whether sphere considerations actu-
ally influence service refusal.  Although a couple’s anniversary could be
celebrated privately, it differs from a wedding along additional, non-
sphere dimensions.  For example, Stutzman also argued that her level of
involvement would have been higher in a wedding than in other celebra-
tions.227  Similarly, baker Jack Phillips argued that he would willingly sell
off-the-shelf products to same-sex weddings but would not create custom
messages in relation to same-sex marriage because it requires his personal
involvement.228  Distinctions based on the level of involvement, intimacy,
or creativity invested in the product or service, and their potential role in
moderating religion–equality conflicts, could be studied in future
research.
The variation of social impact regulation between legal contexts is ex-
pected, as no single factor ever explains the entire variation in human
behavior, even in a specific context.229  Nevertheless, social patterns are
important for legal analysis and often have substantial normative implica-
tions.  The next Part turns to evaluate these implications.
IV. EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
After establishing social impact regulation as a central influence on
the religious response to equality challenges, we can turn to evaluate this
phenomenon in relation to the debate on religion and equality.  I will
address two questions in particular.  First, what explains social impact reg-
ulation and why is it adopted by religious communities?  Second, how can
social impact regulation inform legal and political debates on religion and
equality?
LGBTQ customers more broadly. Id. at 1211–12; see also Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 1–2, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
227. Arlene’s Flowers Inc., 441 P.3d at 488–89.
228. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring).
229. LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:  PER-
SPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991).
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A. What Explains Social Impact Regulation?
Social impact regulation is not readily explainable by common theo-
ries of social control.  First, while social impact regulation could be de-
scribed as a form of selective enforcement, it departs from previous
models of selective enforcement.  This is because the selection is not
founded only on a sense of justice and compassion,230 efficiency consider-
ations,231 scarcity of resources,232 or preferential treatment of a favored
group of gender or race.233  Rather, as I showed in this Article, social im-
pact regulation operates on specific distinctions of sphere and role.  In
addition, selective enforcement is an awkward framework to apply to social
impact regulation, because the pertinent rule-makers—the individuals ap-
plying social impact regulation—seem to feel very much responsible to
uphold the norms and typically consider sexual nonconformity as a sin
and fear that it might spread to others in their community.
It is also difficult to explain social impact regulation as a social deter-
rence model. Social deterrence models predict that enforcement bodies
would supplant actual sanctions for threats of sanction and cultivate fears
to deter noncompliance.234  While the qualitative findings cannot attest to
the likely possibility that nonconformists in religious communities fear
sanctions, the religious leaders in the study did not show signs of inten-
tionally cultivating such fears.  In fact, they actively assisted nonconformists
in escaping sanctions.
Why, then, do religious institutions apply social impact regulation? I
consider three potential explanations (or causes).  Each explanation of-
fers a different interpretation of the phenomenon and yields insight re-
garding the modes by which rights conflicts could be resolved.  The
explanations also illustrate the inadequacy of the culture war paradigm to
explain the variation and dynamism that were documented throughout
this Article.
1. Social Impact Regulation as a Compromise
The first explanation for why religious institutions apply social impact
regulation is that, in some cases, the costs of conflict are greater than the
costs of tolerance.  If this is the case, religious leaders might be willing to
compromise religious normativity to reduce or avoid conflict.  The lead-
ers’ descriptions of the conflict as “really, really tough,”235 a “PR
230. Stephen A. Schiller, More Light on a Low Visibility Function: The Selective
Enforcement of Laws (Part 2), 2 POLICE L. Q. 20, 24–29 (1972).
231. Id. at 30–31.
232. Id. at 20.
233. Douglas A. Smith & Christy A. Visher, Street-Level Justice: Situational Deter-
minants of Police Arrest Decisions, 29 SOC. PROBS. 167, 169 (1981).
234. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349 (1997); see also CHARLES R. TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE?: THE
QUESTIONS OF DETERRENCE (1980).
235. Interview with Leader #9 (May 2014).
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nightmare,”236 and a “political nightmare”237 disclose the personal costs
of the conflict.  Mr. Smith, a high-ranking administrator who advises Cath-
olic schools across the nation, elaborated on both the personal and social
costs from the administrator’s perspective:
Bishops don’t want to be involved with this either.  When these
kinds of matters emerge, it’s very difficult because there is
human implications to it.  And the other part of it of course, is
the whole political implication. Meaning, typically if these em-
ployees have been effective in their roles, whether as a teacher, as
a principal, or [as] an administrator, they have a history of work-
ing with kids and families and people become very attached to
these folks and become very loyal to them. And so, when those
decisions need to be made people seem to rally. . . .  Rally against
the school, and the church’s position.  And so what you have,
clearly, what you have is an administrator that’s personally con-
flicted.  Trying to do what’s right from the perspectives of the
church, and what the teachings are from the church.  Then
maybe have this kind of human emotional side to it.  So they’re
dealing with their own personal conflict, if you will.238
These accounts describe the conflict as an impossible choice, one that
even bishops seek to avoid, involving a competition between religious doc-
trine, political pressures, and personal emotions for the nonconformists.
Onerous factors pulling in opposite directions invite a compromise.
Distinctions of sphere and role might have emerged as a solution because
they provide a middle way.  On one hand, they preserve religious order at
the institutional and formal level; the religious norm remains intact and is
publicly observed.  On the other hand, the distinctions preserve noncon-
formists as part of the community, avoid the political conflict, and main-
tain good terms with the law (at least as long as they succeed in preventing
conflict).  Social impact regulation is thus capable of sustaining both com-
munity norms and community members.
The extent to which this compromise would be adopted by particular
institutions may depend on multiple factors, including the existence or
absence of legal pressure.  The findings from the interviews indicate that
social impact regulation is often applied without a threat of lawsuit.  It also
appears in regimes that exempt religious institutions entirely from antidis-
crimination law.239  Yet there are also cases that exemplify its emergence
in response to direct legal pressure.  The San Francisco agreement was
justified by the Archbishop as a compromise needed “to prohibit local gov-
236. Interview with Leader #13 (June 2014).
237. Interview with Leader #5 (Apr. 2014).
238. Interview with Leader #10 (May 2014).
239. See, e.g., Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, 579 F.3d 722, 762
(6th Cir. 2009).
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ernment from forcing our Catholic agencies” to recognize domestic part-
nerships.240  An identical policy was adopted by the Church in Michigan
in 2016 in response to changes in the law and pressures to offer health
benefits to same-sex partners.  The San Francisco and Michigan agree-
ments demonstrate the direct use of social impact regulation in the con-
struction of compromises, not only with respect to singular cases (as in
decisions about specific employees or students) but also with respect to
general policy problems.
2. Social Impact Regulation as a Distinction Between Wrongs
A second potential explanation for the religious willingness to toler-
ate sexual nonconformity under social impact regulation is rooted in the
common distinction in ethics and law between two types of wrongs: malum
prohibitum (or mala prohibita)—wrong (only) because it is prohibited—and
malum in se—wrong in itself.241  The first kind of wrong involves a behav-
ior that is not inherently immoral, but becomes wrong by its prohibition.
For example, there is nothing inherently wrong in crossing the road on
red or in driving above the speed limit.  These behaviors are made wrongs
by the laws that prohibited them in the pursuit of external goals.  The
contrasting example is taking a man’s life.  This is a moral wrong in itself.
Same-sex relationships and out-of-wedlock pregnancies were clearly
considered wrong by the Catholic leaders.  But what kind of wrong?  One
possibility is that these wrongs are considered as mala in se, i.e., immoral
and sinful in their own right.  But if same-sex relationships and out-of-
wedlock pregnancies had been perceived as mala in se, sphere and role
should not have mattered much.  Consider murder, generally perceived as
malum in se, as the counterfactual.  Tolerating murder in private would
seem outrageous and unjustifiable to most people, regardless of the offi-
cial response to public murder.  It is difficult to imagine the religious lead-
ers comfortably defending private murder.
It therefore seems unlikely that same-sex and unmarried relationships
are a “wrong” of the same type as murder.  Social impact regulation sug-
gests that leaders evaluate these perceived nonconformities, even implic-
itly, as more similar to mala prohibita.  As Mark Davis notes, one of the
characteristics of mala prohibita offences—among which he lists homosexu-
ality—is that society particularly objects to their public manifestations, but
not so much to their occurrence behind closed doors.242  Consequently,
240. Minow, supra note 1, at 832.
241. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 959–60 (6th ed. 1990).
242. Mark S. Davis, Crimes mala in se: An Equity-Based Definition, 17 CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. 270 (2006).  I elaborate on anti-sodomy laws in the next section. See
Section V.A.3, infra.  Notably, I do not suggest that the leaders believed that relig-
ious doctrine referred to these conducts as mala prohibita, but rather that the lead-
ers themselves were not necessarily committed to the idea that unmarried
pregnancy and same-sex relationships are intrinsically wrong.  Under this explana-
tion, the scripture guided their judgments through its legal authority, not necessa-
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the leaders’ application of social impact regulation discloses a perception
which resembles the common perception of traffic laws: crossing the street
on red is not intrinsically wrong but should nevertheless be prohibited for
safety purposes.  Accordingly, and analogous to the sphere distinction,
most people would consider red-light crossing to be significantly less
harmful on an empty street—when no one sees it or is harmed by it.  At
the same time, and analogous to the role distinction, while many would
excuse ordinary folks in such circumstances, fewer would absolve police-
men in the same way.  People typically believe that policemen must always
follow the law, not because traffic offences are intrinsically wrong, but be-
cause the police are expected to model compliance.
The Catholic Charities placement of children with same-sex couples
in Boston over two decades243 seems to exemplify this distinction.  This
setting does not lend itself easily to the compromise explanation.  Adop-
tive same-sex couples are not longtime members of the community, whose
termination would become immediately known and upsetting for many,
but strangers, whose interaction with the charities could conclude with a
single encounter and template rejection.  Nevertheless, Catholic Charities
of Boston placed children with same-sex couples voluntarily and in the
absence of any direct legal challenge or media exposure.  This record does
not seem to reflect a compromise, but perhaps a perception that same-sex
parenting is not inherently immoral and thus could be permitted in some
circumstances.  The refusal of the Church to continue with this practice
after it became public is also consistent with a distinction between wrongs;
while the nature of the wrong could justify a lenient approach, it is not a
ground to repeal a law.244
Understanding social impact regulation as a distinction between
wrongs is not necessarily an alternative to understanding it as a compro-
mise.  The two explanations nuance each other.  First, the distinction-be-
tween-wrongs analysis explains why compromise is possible; if the subject
of equality challenges were considered mala in se, it is unlikely that a com-
promise could have been achieved, regardless of the benefits.  Second, the
distinction-between-wrongs analysis can highlight what compromises are
rily its moral persuasion.  I thank Rick Garnett for insightful feedback on this
point.
243. Minow, supra note 1, at 831–37.
244. Other distinctions between norms are probably at work. See, e.g., Barak-
Corren, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 20 (documenting a distinction between
the wrong itself and having a relationship of sorts (e.g., employment) with some-
one who committed the wrong).  Drawing on a large-scale survey (N=1,941) of U.S.
Christians, I found that 46% of the sample believed that unwed pregnancy is relig-
iously forbidden as compared with 36% who believed that employing an unwed
pregnant teacher is religiously forbidden. Id. at 1004 n.142.  Differences in beliefs
were correlated with decision-making patterns in that study.  When presented with
a scenario of a religious school principal who deliberated whether to dismiss an
unwed pregnant teacher, 35% of those who thought that unwed pregnancy is relig-
iously forbidden decided to dismiss the teacher, versus 47% of those who thought
that employing such a teacher is religiously forbidden. Id. at 1004–05, 1004 n.142.
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possible.  Requiring religious communities to “repeal” religious norms is
not likely to yield a compromise.  But redefining categories in ways that
avoid such requirements—e.g., the legally domiciled adult category—can
harness social impact regulation to break through the impasse.  Third, the
distinction-between-wrongs analysis serves as a reminder that social impact
regulation is not only a compromise in response to external pressures, but
also an internal mode of regulation that could be applied without direct
legal or political pressure (as was documented throughout this Article).
I now turn to a third explanation of social impact regulation, one that
is not pragmatic or normative, but rather sociological.
3. Social Impact Regulation as a Bridge to Acceptance
A third explanation for social impact regulation is that it is an inter-
mediate phase between the past ban and future acceptance of a commu-
nity’s presently condemned conduct.  The evolution of religious
accommodations for racial segregation illustrates such a trajectory.  After
the Supreme Court decided conclusively against school segregation in
Brown v. Board of Education,245 it allowed private religious schools to con-
tinue the practice.  However, a decade or so later in Green v. Kennedy,246
the Court ordered the revocation of the tax-exempt status of private
schools that remained segregated, regardless of religious reasons.247  How-
ever, many institutions continued to enforce segregationist policies with
slight compromises aimed at evading the regulation.  For example, a
school might admit only married black students (so as to reduce the likeli-
hood of intermarriage) or admit single black students but enforce non-
interracial dating policies.248  It wasn’t until the 1980s when the Court
decided in Bob Jones University v. United States249 that religiously-motivated
segregation in private educational settings, including in partial form, war-
ranted a removal of tax-exempt benefits.  The Bob Jones decision relied on
changes in American society more than on legal doctrine, suggesting that
as the country’s social norms liberalized, the law had to follow.  Since
then, the issue of tax-exempt status to religious segregationist organiza-
245. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
246. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (1970).
247. Id. at 1131.
248. Bob Jones University is the most well-known example of such schools.
See Justin Taylor, Is Segregation Scriptural? A Radio Address from Bob Jones on Easter of
1960, GOSPEL COALITION (July 26, 2016) https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/
blogs/evangelical-history/is-segregation-scriptural-a-radio-address-from-bob-jones-
on-easter-of-1960/ [https://perma.cc/23AK-UDXH].  Bob Jones himself argued
that race-based segregation is mandated by the Bible. Id.  Notably, Jones did not
argue that some races were superior or inferior to others, but simply that the Bible
prohibited their mixing. Id.
249. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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tions has become “closed,” in keeping with the strong social mores regard-
ing race relations.250
A more recent development, and one which is directly relevant to so-
cial impact regulation, is the transformation of attitudes towards homosex-
uality and same-sex relationships in the last century.  Since the
Revolutionary War, homosexual service members were considered a risk to
the American military and were disqualified, hunted, prosecuted, and dis-
charged.251  In 1993, a “don’t ask, don’t tell” (DADT) policy—in effect, a
public/private distinction—was introduced as a compromise between ac-
tivists and traditionalists.252  In 2010, DADT made way to full inclusion of
publicly open LGBTQ individuals in the military.253  During this long pe-
riod, transitions also occurred outside the military.  What began as a fel-
ony—homosexual conduct was prohibited under the penal codes of many
American states—became protected and decriminalized under conditions
of privacy in the landmark Lawrence decision, which emphasized that
“adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives.”254  State and local governments began
enacting antidiscrimination protections for LGBTQ individuals and recog-
nizing same-sex marriage; in 2016, same-sex marriage became the law of
the land.255
If these historical processes have any relevance to social impact regu-
lation as applied by conservative religious groups today, they suggest that
social impact regulation could be a phase that precedes broader accept-
ance and equality, as occurred with respect to race and religion (a process
that included renewed interpretations of biblical texts that previously were
believed to be mandating segregation256); and as occurred with respect to
societal and legal attitudes towards sexual orientation (a process which is
still ongoing).
The time trend seems to support this hypothesis.  Support for same-
sex marriage is steadily growing among all religious sects, particularly
250. Minow, supra note 1, at 799–803.  Bob Jones University repealed its seg-
regationist policy in 2000 and apologized for its misrepresentation of the word of
God.  Taylor, supra note 248.
251. ALLAN BÉRUBÉ, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND
WOMEN IN WORLD WAR II 9–14 (2010).
252. OUT IN FORCE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE MILITARY 8 (Gregory M.
Herek et al. eds. 1996).
253. President Barack Obama signed the DADT Repeal Act in December
2010, pending military certification of readiness which came in July 2011.  The
effective end date of the policy was September 20, 2011.  Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
Repeal Act of 2010, 111 Pub. L. 321 § 1 (2010); Department of Defense, Repeal of
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT): Quick Reference Guide (Oct. 28, 2011), http://
archive.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_dadt/Quick_Reference_Guide_
Repeal_of_DADT_APPROVED.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENG4-M4X3].
254. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
255. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
256. Supra note 248.
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among younger generations.257  However, it is important to note that lib-
eralization is not a necessary consequence of social impact regulation.
Jewish communities applied the sphere distinction to Jews who did not
follow traditional Sabbath observance rules for centuries, without resulting
in public normalization of Sabbath desecration (although the meaning of
observance has changed throughout the years).  Whether social impact
regulation is part of a liberalization process is therefore an open question.
Some religious leaders noted that their communities were changing, while
others were more skeptical of whether formal change is likely to occur258
Yet even if social impact regulation does not predict a nearing change, it
may still be the case that any such change first requires a limited form of
acceptance to emerge.
As noted above, the three explanations to social impact regulation are
not mutually exclusive.  Compromise could be a phase to something else
and normative distinctions can emerge in response to social change.
While none of these explanations provide a single conclusive answer, each
of them unsettles the “ugly picture” of the culture wars paradigm as ap-
plied to religion–equality conflicts, which is dominated by irreconcilable
values, fears of escalation, and collision courses.259  In contrast, social im-
pact regulation draws a picture composed of compromise, nuanced dis-
tinctions, liberalization, or all of the above.  These two portraits of
conservative religion—the belligerent and the struggling—coexist side by
side.  As religion struggles with finding nuanced responses to equality
challenges, law needs to begin acknowledging these additional aspects of
the religious response to the conflict and develop a normative framework
that takes these aspects into account.
B. How Social Impact Regulation Informs Law and Politics
1. The Adjudication of Religious Claims
Now that we have a more expansive and nuanced understanding of
the conflict between religion and equality, it is time to consider how the
war within religion could bear on the resolution of such conflicts.  The
analysis will naturally focus on social impact regulation as it is the central
practice discussed in this Article, but it should be noted that other forms
of internal decision-making could influence doctrine in additional ways.
For the purposes of the discussion, let us assume the typical case in
which a court is asked to evaluate a discrimination claim brought against a
religious organization that arguably acted on religious reasons.  As social
257. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 81; Caryle Murphy, Most U.S. Christian
Groups Grow More Accepting of Homosexuality, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 18, 2015), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/18/most-u-s-christian-groups-grow-more
-accepting-of-homosexuality/ [https://perma.cc/Y29Y-BNQF].
258. Interview with Leader #5 (Apr. 2014) (“I don’t think the doctrine of or-
ganized religion is going to change.  Not in my lifetime.”).
259. See supra notes 21–80 and accompanying text.
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impact regulation has never been formally articulated, conceptualized, or
discussed by the courts, there is no clear answer as to how, if at all, courts
should consider it in the adjudication of such disputes.  I will briefly review
and discuss three potential legal approaches to social impact regulation
that could be applied in these cases.
The first approach is to demand the application of social impact regulation
whenever it increases inclusion and mitigates the conflict between religion
and equality.  To elaborate on what such pro-social impact regulation
(pro-SIR) approach might entail, we can consider the decision of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Schüth v. Germany260 as a stimu-
lating example.261  Mr. Schüth, the head musician at a Catholic parish in
Germany, was dismissed for engaging in an extramarital relationship.262
Mr. Schüth had publicly separated from his wife several years before the
event, but the couple did not divorce.263  The dismissal occurred after Mr.
Schüth’s children had told people at their kindergarten that their father
was going to have another child.264  The ECHR accepted Mr. Schüth’s
application, noting that Schüth kept his nonconformity private, did not
publicly challenge the stances of the Catholic Church, and that the case
did not receive media coverage.265  The ECHR decision is rooted in the
assertion that the Church could have tolerated Schüth’s behavior, yet
chose not to do so; therefore, the termination is unjustified. Schüth illus-
trates a model that scrutinizes the necessity of religious opposition to
equality challenges and examines whether exclusion could have been
avoided using social impact regulation.
Therefore, the model provides a heightened level of protection and
inclusion to individuals within conservative religious groups and does so
with what seems like minimal intervention in religious autonomy.  The
pro-SIR approach draws on a distinction which is already accepted and
operated by the group and simply holds the group accountable to it.  It
does not impose a foreign normative standard on the group or force the
group to endorse norms to which it objects.  In cases litigated under a
federal or state RFRA, where the government is prohibited from “substan-
260. Schüth v. Germany, Cour Européenne Dse Droits De L’Homme [ECHR]
[European Court of Human Rights] Sept. 23, 2010, Application. No. 1620/03
(Ger.).
261. Id.
262. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 13.
263. Id. at ¶ 11.
264. Id. at ¶ 12. Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, 579 F.3d 722
(6th Cir. 2009), presents a similar factual background.  However, perhaps because
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was not prohibited in Kentucky at
the time of Pedreira’s termination, the case did not bring these facts to bear on its
decision.
265. Schüth, ECHR at ¶ 72.
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tially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion,”266 the pro-SIR ap-
proach can be viewed as imposing no “substantial” burden on religion.267
Alternatively, even if the burden is held to be substantial, the pro-SIR
approach still may be the “least restrictive means” of furthering the com-
pelling governmental interest in non-discrimination.268  First, the ap-
proach is a form of religious accommodation that is crafted from the
group’s own tools to accommodate the conflict.  Furthermore, sphere and
role distinctions are not foreign to law, and are specifically applied via
other rules to the resolution of conflicts between law and religion.269  A
dominant example is the “ministerial exception,” a role-based distinction
that provides religious institutions with the liberty to employ their minis-
ters but holds them accountable to general law with respect to other em-
ployees.  Designing a similar rule based on the sphere distinction is
compatible with existing doctrine.270
At the same time, a pro-SIR approach raises several considerations
that could vary its appeal for different legal regimes.  In regimes that con-
strue religious autonomy broadly and weigh it heavily, the attempt to
probe into religious practices and derive rules that would bind religious
claimants might be tantamount to undue interference with religious au-
tonomy.271  In contrast, in regimes that construe religious autonomy nar-
rowly and place a heavy weight on non-discrimination, a social impact rule
266. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)–(b) (2018) (unless the government demonstrates
a compelling governmental interest and that the burden applied is the least restric-
tive means of furthering that interest).
267. See Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV.
1185, 1247–53 (2017) (analyzing the elements of the substantial burden test).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)–(b) (2018) (providing that the burden on relig-
ion should be the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling government
interest).
269. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLASSICS IN
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 4 (rev. paperback ed. 1996) (arguing, as part of
the idea of public reason, that the divide is essential to create an “overlapping
consensus” in society).
270. The literature on the ministerial exemption also tied it to sphere-related
ideas, albeit in the liberal notion of religion as a private association. See Christo-
pher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitu-
tional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1311–13 (1994)
(contending that “ideas about privacy” and “private association” support the right
of religious organizations to select their leaders); James Oleske, Free Exercise
(Dis)Honesty, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 690, 723 (2019) (“Another justification for the min-
isterial exception is that it flows naturally from the broader public[-]private distinc-
tion embodied in constitutional doctrine . . . .”).
271. In general, American courts have been reluctant to develop tests that
would require—or give the appearance of requiring—an evaluation of religious
beliefs and practices. See Anna Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, 5 OXF. J. L. & RELIG-
ION 28 (2016) (discussing the drawbacks of the highly deferential sincerity test
adopted by courts); see also Marc O. DeGirolami, Religious Accommodation, Religious
Tradition, and Political Polarization, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1127, 1132 (2017)
(arguing that, “The refusal of courts to make any serious inquiry into the nature of
the asserted religious burden has encouraged increasingly bizarre, aggressive, self-
indulgent, ephemeral, and scattershot assertions of religious freedom.”).
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could be deemed insufficient and problematic in its own right.  This is
because social impact regulation ultimately restricts the ability of individu-
als to express themselves freely on the basis of their gender or sexual ori-
entation and confines them to limited spheres and roles.272  Pro-equality
regimes might also worry that conferring institutional legitimacy on social
impact regulation might entrench these limitations and detract from the
prospect of achieving complete equality.  This analysis suggests that the
obligatory approach to social impact regulation would be less appealing to
regimes that take an absolutist approach towards either religious liberty or
gender equality and more appealing to regimes that are committed to bal-
ancing the two rights.
The second potential approach is to reject the application of social impact
regulation and interpret it as a sign of inconsistency.  Under this approach,
a religion that selectively enforces its norms indicates inconsistency, which
could either count as insincerity or as plain discrimination.  Several courts
adopted the view that selective enforcement undermines the religious ar-
gument.  Specifically in the context of unmarried pregnancy, institutions
that enforced the rule against extramarital sex based on the visibility of
pregnancy were found to discriminate against women (other publicity or
privacy policies were not discussed in these cases).273  The flipside of this
272. See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE 191–92 (1989) (criticizing the public/private divide and notions of pri-
vacy generally, and family privacy in particular, as the marker of women’s subordi-
nation and oppression).  Support for the idea that the public/private divide ca be
harmful, albeit from a different perspective, can be found in Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992) (criticizing
the allocation of religious activity to the private realm as reductive and hostile to-
wards religion); cf. Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that the feminist perspective fails to acknowledge
privacy as a desirable source of individual protection from public and social
scrutiny).
273. Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 667 (6th Cir. 2000)
(permitting the case of an unmarried pregnant teacher to proceed to trial, holding
that the school could not “use the mere observation or knowledge of pregnancy as
its sole method of detecting violations of its premarital sex policy” without violating
Title VII); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (permitting the claim to proceed to trial, reasoning that “women would
be subject to termination for something that men would not be, and that is sex
discrimination”).  This approach has been applied to other rules and forms of se-
lective enforcement. See, e.g., EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485–86 (5th Cir.
1980) (explaining that the Baptist college’s argument would fail if the plaintiff
would show evidence that the proclaimed Baptist hiring policy was selectively en-
forced); Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend Inc., No. 1:12–CV–122 RLM,
2015 WL 1013783 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 9, 2015) (a petition to set aside a jury verdict
that accepted the discrimination claim of a married teacher, fired for IVF treat-
ments, who showed that three male employees who were thrown out of a strip club
after harassing one of the performers were reprimanded but not fired; the judge
holds that this evidence is admissible and has “probative value as the only instance
(as far as this record showed) in which a male employee’s conduct was known to
the diocese as potentially running afoul of the “morals clause””; elsewhere, the
decision describes the diocese’s policy as a “don’t ask, don’t tell” rule that discrimi-
nates against women because of the visibility of pregnancy).
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reasoning is Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis, Inc.,274 in which a relig-
ious college successfully defended against a discrimination claim after its
president testified about conducting active investigations into the conduct
of both men and women and dismissing all employees who engaged in
unmarried sex without regard to their sex and the visibility of their con-
duct.275  Extrapolating from these decisions to the broader phenomenon
of social impact regulation suggests an anti-social impact regulation (anti-
SIR) approach.  This approach would view social impact regulation as a
sign of inconsistency in the application of religious norms and would re-
quire religious institutions to strictly enforce their rules to prevail in court.
The anti-SIR model raises several issues.  First, it does not seem to
improve on the first model in terms of reducing the burden on religion.
On the contrary, whereas the pro-SIR model built on social impact regula-
tion and legitimated its application, the anti-SIR model turns social impact
regulation against religious groups and delegitimizes the policy entirely.  A
second issue is that the antagonistic approach to social impact regulation
appears rooted in consistency requirements, although it is not clear that
courts are allowed to consider the consistency of religious beliefs and prac-
tices under current precedent.  In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment Security Division,276 the Supreme Court explicitly decided that a
free exercise claim “is not to turn upon judicial perception of the particu-
lar belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection.”277  The Court further clarified that “[c]ourts
should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer ad-
mits that he is ‘struggling’ with his position or because his beliefs are not
articulated with . . . clarity and precision.”278  However, courts, including
the Supreme Court, often deviate from this precedent, in practice if not
explicitly, and attribute evidentiary value to signs of consistency or incon-
sistency.279  As several commentators noted, examining religious consis-
274. 88 F.3d 410, 414–15 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court’s deci-
sion to dismiss the claim).
275. Id. at 412; see also Wilson, supra note 96, at 448–52 (reaching a similar
conclusion in her analysis of these and other cases).
276. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
277. Id. at 714.
278. Id. at 715.
279. See, e.g., supra notes 273–74; Oleske, supra note 270, at 717–19 (describ-
ing the Court’s paradoxical disavowal of evaluations of religious belief and practice
in Thomas and almost simultaneous discussion of the relationship of the Amish
religion to American history, suggesting the Court has not been able to fully com-
ply with its own rule). Burwell v. Hobby Lobby also provides an interesting example
of this phenomenon.  134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014).  The decision details the con-
sistency of the plaintiff’s religious practices—in addition to refusing to provide
contraceptives, the store also closes on Sundays, contributes profits to Christian
charities, and refuses to engage in profitable transactions that “facilitate or pro-
mote alcohol use,”—in spite of the formal irrelevance of such information. Id. at
2766.
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tency may be required to evaluate the sincerity of religious claims, and
therefore is justified.280  Yet even if courts are justified in analyzing relig-
ious consistency, it does not necessarily entail an antagonistic approach to
social impact regulation.  Consistency is an evasive concept which requires
careful and thoughtful applications.  Like equality, which applies only if
two people are similarly situated, consistency should only be evaluated if
two decisions are similarly situated.  And it is not clear that decisions that
vary in their sphere and role attributes are similarly situated: sphere and
role are reasoned distinctions that fit within the practice of religious com-
munities more generally281 and could be applied consistently across bases
of discrimination.  Under this analysis, the anti-SIR model is wrong to the
extent it equates social impact regulation with inconsistency and rejects its
practice because of this assessment.
The anti-SIR model is also less likely than the pro-SIR model to im-
prove the protection of individuals within groups.  Instead of requiring
religious institutions to find inclusive solutions and tolerate private viola-
tions of religious norms, the anti-SIR approach incentivizes religious
institutions to intrude into the private lives of employees, make all non-
conformities public, and strictly enforce religious norms to secure a legal
exemption.282  The anti-SIR model is therefore problematic from both re-
ligious and equality perspectives.
Between these two poles we may consider a third approach to social
impact regulation, one that would not automatically require or penalize its
application.  Instead, such a model could take into account an institution’s
previous record in handling equality challenges and examine whether the
record indicates a pattern of discrimination (for example, only women
lose their job for unmarried relationships) or a pattern of inclusive regula-
tion that effectively accommodates individuals (some forms of social im-
pact regulation could fit into this category).  Importantly, the interim
model would attribute positive—not negative—value to selective enforce-
ment, if shown to be part of an institutional policy that seeks to self-accom-
modate the tension with equality norms.  Under this model, religious
institutions should be allowed to bring evidence on how they previously
dealt with equality challenges and establish their track-record of social im-
pact regulation or other forms of inclusive policy with facts.  A religious
280. Chapman, supra note 267, at 1234 (stating that “The most powerful evi-
dence of religious insincerity may be evidence that claimants have stated or acted
inconsistently with their alleged religious beliefs” but urging that “[c]ourts should
be thoughtful about how they evaluate evidence of inconsistent conduct or state-
ments, though.  People change over time.  Their religious beliefs change.”);
DeGirolami, supra note 271, at 1134 (raising similar concerns that internal and
community-level consistency is not available for courts to evaluate when determin-
ing substantial burden or sincerity analyses).
281. Chapman suggests that courts should consider community fit evidence,
not as dispositive of sincerity, but as another indication thereof.  Chapman, supra
note 267, at 1239.
282. See, e.g., Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1996).
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organization that provides substantial and compelling evidence that its
policy effectively included protected individuals in (say) 80% of the cases,
and turns to the court to seek exemptions in the remaining 20% that it
cannot accommodate on its own (in its view), should not be disfavored
compared to an organization that externalizes the costs of faith on others
in 100% of the conflicts.  If anything, the self-accommodating organiza-
tion should be favored.
The interim model has advantages with respect to both the pro-SIR
and anti-SIR models.  It avoids the pitfalls of the anti-SIR model by re-
jecting the problematic inconsistency argument; and by setting the incen-
tives straight for increased non-discrimination protection.  It also improves
on the pro-SIR model by relaxing the requirement to apply social impact
regulation and replacing it with a more flexible rule that weighs social
impact regulation as one factor, without making it the dispositive factor in
the case.  In addition, there is an advantage in crafting a legal rule that
encourages the parties to embrace nuanced positions, particularly in the
context of a political culture war, where individual cases too often become
the poster of a socio-legal battle and erroneously come to represent the
entire camp.283
At the same time, the equality concerns that were raised against the
pro-SIR model apply with similar force for the interim model.  The in-
terim model does not offer full protection to individuals and, alongside its
inclusiveness gains, it also has discriminatory drawbacks.  As Section IV.A
supra concluded, it is difficult to evaluate the implications of social impact
regulation to the future trajectory of the conflict between religion and
equality.  Accordingly, different regimes could be more or less inclined to
apply the interim social impact regulation rule, depending on the relative
value they attribute to LGBTQ and gender equality and religious liberty.
This Section presented three normative models to incorporate social
impact regulation in the adjudication of religion–equality conflicts.  Each
of these models has advantages and disadvantages.  Notably, I do not in-
tend to settle the choice in any of these models in this Article.  I also ex-
pect that additional models could be generated and I would welcome their
discussion.  My aim was to demonstrate the significance of incorporating
social impact regulation into legal analysis and the potential effects of
such doctrinal change.  The reality is that social impact distinctions are
present in many of the cases—from Alice Pedreira, the therapist fired for a
photograph, to the gay student prohibited from posting on YouTube284—
yet they have not been systematically explored or theorized as part of a
general phenomenon.  Understanding religion–equality conflicts against
the background of this Article requires courts to consider the normative
questions that social impact regulation raises.
283. See supra Section I.A.
284. Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009);
Shen, supra note 221.
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2. The Negotiation of Solutions and Accommodations
In addition to informing the adjudication of conflicts, social impact
regulation can also inform political negotiators, including governors, may-
ors, and city administrators, seeking to reconcile conflicts between religion
and equality.  To achieve successful solutions, these actors must under-
stand the conflicts they negotiate.  In general, this means that negotiators
should nuance their assumptions regarding the culture war paradigm and
assume instead that religious groups are diverse, that religious leaders
have substantial latitude in the application of religious rules, and that re-
ligion is dynamic and evolves with and in response to other social
processes.  Hence, negotiators should actively search for information
about these aspects of their negotiating partner and how they reflect in
religious institutions and practices.  Such information could highlight
points of potential compromise and areas ripe for agreement.
More specifically, negotiators should embrace two important lessons.
First, the stringency of the norm should be separated from the flexibility
of its enforcement.  Often, normative stringency leads to the conclusion
that exemptions are required.  In culture war terms, if culture A believes
in marriage equality and culture B opposes same-sex marriage, the out-
come is assumed to be either an exemption or a conflict, as there is no
middle ground.285  Yet this Article reveals that the high stringency of the
norm against same-sex relationships does not imply zero latitude in the
application of this norm.  In practice, the religious response to same-sex
relationships (among other equality challenges) varies systematically based
on social impact regulation, or conditions that are independent from the
norm.  Negotiators should embrace the gap between the norm and its en-
forcement because it opens a space for creative solutions and potential
compromise.
Second, negotiators should be cognizant of the portfolio of strategies
that is available to them through social impact regulation.  For example, if
the policy goal includes expanding healthcare or workplace benefits,
policymakers need not necessarily enter conflicts regarding same-sex mar-
riage; instead, they could exploit the sphere distinction and redefine cate-
gories (e.g., replace “spouse” with “legally domiciled adult”).  In addition,
policymakers could strengthen privacy protections.  For example, schools
and employers could be prohibited from collecting information on per-
sonal status, such that the status of a teacher or student—married or not,
and to whom—would not be actionable.  Such policy can bolster the abil-
ity of religious leaders to resist internal pressures to conduct investigations
285. See Koppelman, supra note 73, at 139 (arguing that religious exemptions
are necessary due to the stringent religious opposition to homosexuality); Horwitz,
Against Martyrdom, supra note 13 (arguing that exemptions are needed because the
values are incommensurable).
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and assist religious leaders looking to avoid learning information that
might lead to a conflict in their institution.286
More generally, the search for solutions can benefit from tracing and
drawing on bridging values, including compassion and humility, and pol-
icy goals, such as access to health care for all or caring for families and
children in need.  Emphasizing cultural points of overlap and agreement
in religion–equality conflicts can motivate and create the will necessary to
achieve solutions.  While these tools should not be expected to succeed in
all cases, they expand the narrow portfolio that serves negotiators today,
which is composed primarily of exemption and coercion.287
CONCLUSION
This Article has three primary contributions.  First, it modifies the
dominant view of the conflict between religion and equality as a war be-
tween cultures, with an elaborate, wider and deeper understanding of the
conflict as occurring also within culture.  Following this approach, and fo-
cusing on the Catholic case study, I investigated several of the conditions
under which organized religion takes an oppositional or tolerant position
towards equality challenges.  This examination demonstrated that the re-
sponse of religious actors to gender and LGBTQ equality is far from mon-
olithic and is not necessarily oppositional, even among leaders whose
moral worldviews reject non-traditional sexuality and gender norms.
Based on these results, I argue that the current debate must change.
Current accounts of the state of the religion–equality conflict do not suffi-
ciently consider the internal struggle within religion to accommodate per-
ceived sexual nonconformity, a struggle that mitigates the conflict
substantially even if it does not resolve it entirely.  Critiques of religious
accommodations worry about further escalation of religious objection,
which will result in additional discrimination of third parties and extend
social conflict.  These concerns are extremely important, yet to evaluate
them we need to observe not only the present state of the war between
cultures, but also the war within culture; not only the vocal organizations
and pastors who promise a war, but also the practice of grassroots organi-
zations, pertinent decision-makers, markets, and communities within
which conflicts occur on a frequent basis.  This Article creates a more com-
plete and nuanced account of religion–equality conflicts that requires
scholars to pause and reassess their current analyses and predictions.
Second, this Article opens the door to a new research agenda, dedi-
cated to exploring on-the-ground, out-of-the-courtroom processes and
their implications for the reconciliation of religion–equality conflicts.  In
particular, additional empirical research is needed on the broader effects
of social impact regulation: to what extent does social impact regulation
286. Supra note 155.
287. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 96; Horwitz, Hobby Lobby, supra note 54;
Nejaime & Siegel, Complicity-Based Conscience, supra note 14.
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influence decisions in real time, causally shaping behavior?  What is the
relative effect of sphere and role and how do they interact in shaping deci-
sions?  To what extent does social impact regulation emerge in response to
legal developments or independent from them?  How does the litigation
of a dispute influence the application of social impact regulation and the
policy’s ability to mitigate the conflict?  Does social impact regulation gen-
eralize to additional religions, and to additional countries?  How do indi-
viduals subject to social impact regulation perceive it and the effect it has
on their lives?288  How do modes of regulation of grassroots organizations
intersect with political movements, if at all?
Finally, this Article contributes to the search after solutions to the
conflict.  Courts now need to consider new questions of law, and govern-
ments and organizations may draw on additional tools to reduce and solve
conflict.  Integrating social impact regulation into legal doctrine offers a
“tertium quid”289 to the stark opposition between liberty and equality that
neither courts nor policymakers previously considered.
288. We can hypothesize that their responses might be mixed. See, e.g., Rob-
bee Wedow et al., “I’m Gay and I’m Catholic”: Negotiating Two Complex Identities at a
Catholic University, 78 SOC. RELIGION 289 (2017) (reporting a study of gay and les-
bian students at a Catholic university that found different modes in which students
negotiated their religious and sexual identities; some students embraced both
identities, others rejected either the sexual or the religious identity, and yet others
were uncertain).
289. Returning to Horwitz’s decry of the state of the culture wars and the
failure of the present discourse to generate legal solutions to the conflict. See Hor-
witz, Against Martyrdom, supra note 13.
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